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Abstract
There has been a dangerous gap between American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese
foreign policy, a gap contributing to acceptance of the Thucydides Trap. With the help of a
theoretical framework and empirical evidence, this paper aims to summarize and understand the
differences, in an effort to help overcome them and prevent a self-fulfilling prophecy. The author
identifies five variables that shape perceptions and then categorizes Chinese foreign policy along
several dimensions. Using the South China Sea and the Belt and Road Initiative as case studies,
the author finds that US and Chinese interpretations of Chinese behavior along these dimensions
are influenced by different variables. While the Chinese views are more affected by history,
American perceptions are driven by considerations of power. The two countries understand both
identity and norms differently, as well. By showing where the two countries' perceptions diverge,
the author hopes to help reduce misunderstandings. The paper concludes with some practical
recommendations along these lines.
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Chapter 1 – A Zero Sum Game?
The rise of China has been widely acknowledged after the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympics. Following the 2010 Shanghai EXPO, the major cities of China, along with the
country, drew attention around the globe. The achievements are exemplified at both the state
level and the individual level. At the state level, China’s economy, diplomacy, and security have
advanced significantly. China’s overall GDP has been the second largest in the world since
2010.1 According to some estimates, it became top foreign direct investment country in 2012 and
has been the largest holder of U.S. sovereign debt for a long time.2 In addition to economic
progress, China has been tied to the world more closely diplomatically as well. As of August
2017, it had built different levels of partnership with 97 countries and regions.3 Its strategic
relationships have covered every major region of the world. Security-wise, the People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization has also been expedited. Seven regional commands
were evolved into five combat theaters; President Xi Jinping of China announced that the PLA
would cut 300 thousand troops to condense the military apparatus in 2015; China’s first aircraft
carrier, Liaoning, became combat ready a year later.4 At the individual level, there are also
tremendous improvements. China’s GDP per capita increased from $184 USD in 1979 to

1

Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, "China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-largest Economy," The Guardian,
February 14, 2011, accessed December 01, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-secondlargest-economy.
2
There is huge disparity between different methods of calculation. According to Thomas Christensen, there are
valid sources indicating that China is the largest FDI recipient in the world. Thomas J. Christensen, The China
Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 17.
3
"‘Major-Country Diplomacy’ Second Episode: Zhong Xing Zhi Yuan" [《大国外交》 第二集：众行致远. 新华
网], accessed October 30, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-08/29/c_1121565906.htm.
4
"Reform of China's Army Enters a New Phase," The Economist, August 03, 2017, accessed November 19, 2017,
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21725812-overhaul-says-lot-about-xi-jinpings-governing-style-reformchinas-army-enters-new-phase; "How Does China's First Aircraft Carrier Stack Up? | China Power Project," Center
for Strategic and International Studies, August 09, 2017, accessed November 22, 2017,
https://chinapower.csis.org/aircraft-carrier/.

4

$8123.2 USD in 2016.5 Life expectancy of Chinese at birth prolonged for about 10 years during
the same period.6 The number of Chinese tourists abroad reached a new high of 135 million in
2017.7 Having a huge population abroad, the Chinese government has been increasingly capable
of protecting its citizens. In 2015, when Yemen's government fell into crisis with the Houthi
rebels, the Chinese government sent its convoy to evacuate almost 600 Chinese citizens stranded
there.8 Another 225 foreign nationals were picked up upon foreign governments’ request. As
Princeton University Professor Thomas Christensen contends, the rise of China in all dimensions
is real.9
The rise of China has unsettled many scholars around the world, most notably in the U.S.
As Harvard Professor Graham Allison argues, the rise of China presents the world a new
challenge, that of Thucydides’ Trap:
Thucydides’ Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a
rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its
implications are most dangerous in international affairs… Today it has set the world’s
two biggest powers [the United States and China] on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants,
but which they may prove unable to avoid.10
According to Allison, the Thucydides’ Trap has an impressive predictive power. In the 16 cases
he studied where rising powers posed strategic challenges to existing powers in the last 500

5

"GDP per Capita (current US$)," The World Bank, accessed December 01, 2017,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
6
Although life expectancy increased significantly from 1965 to 1979, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution were the culprits for the significant loss of life during those years. That should not be compared
with natural increase in life expectancy. "Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years)," The World Bank, accessed
December 01, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.
7
Zigor Aldama, "How Surge in Mainland Chinese Tourists Is Changing the World," South China Morning Post,
October 17, 2017, accessed April 18, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/longreads/article/2113116/how-chinese-tourists-are-changing-world.
8
"Yemen Crisis: China Evacuates Citizens and Foreigners from Aden," BBC News, April 03, 2015, accessed
November 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32173811.
9
Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, 13.
10
Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), xvi.

5

years, 12 of them ended up with military conflicts.11 This is not a comfortable ratio. Now as
China becomes stronger in all dimensions, the current global hegemon, the United States,
worries about China’s rise—just as the U.S. worried about the rise of West Germany and Japan
in the 1980s. However, China’s growth has not been slowed by any serious challenges like the
reunification of Germany or the crash of the Japanese yen that stalled those countries’ quick
approach to match the capacity of the United States. The structural conflict, with China’s
continuous rise, puts increasing pressure on the current global hegemon, the United States.
From Allison’s perspective, the worry arises with a reason. The continuing rise of China
seems to push China and the U.S. into the uncomfortable Thucydides’ Trap. The “China threat”
argument has permeated U.S. government and scholarly discussions, and the public imagination.
Classic realism assumes that capability shapes intention.12 As China gets stronger all around,
realists assume that China will increase its influence in many spheres: maximizing territory,
shaping the behaviors of foreign countries, and allocating the global division of labor.13 From the
most imminent to the most distant, increasing Chinese capabilities will gradually dwarf the
comparative advantages the U.S. has enjoyed. With the structural conflict in mind, as China’s
power expands in all dimensions, areas of conflicts of interests also expand. For America, the
increasing feeling of threat seems legitimate under a zero-sum assumption. Nonetheless, the
Thucydides’ Trap cannot avoid the criticism that it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more the
U.S. deems China’s rise as an aggression, the more insecure it is. America’s insecurity will
naturally lead to its countermeasures to ensure its strategic advantage, which will put China in a

11

Ibid, 42.
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 5.
13
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 23-25.
12
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position of improving its defense. This vicious spiral effect will push China and the U.S. closer
and closer to war.
U.S. politicians and scholars certainly understand this danger. As Raymond Cohen
argues, “Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in the
international crisis.”14 However, rational responses based on realistic threat assessments are more
easily prescribed than achieved, not least because American perceptions of Chinese foreign
policy are different from the Chinese perceptions. In most cases, the U.S. government claims that
Chinese actions disrupt the global system or regional stability, whereas the Chinese government
considers them benign or neutral. For instance, when Chinese officials sketch the future of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), they often highlight its economic benefits to “[enhance]
connectivity and [unlock] Eurasia’s economic potential.”15 On the contrary, western scholars
usually stress BRI’s strategic implications to create an alternative regional financial system, and
counter America’s rebalance to Asia policy by changing its focus to the Eurasian landmass.16
At face value, it seems that the divergent interpretations of BRI are grounded in different
assumptions. The American perception stems from realist assumptions; the Chinese perception
comes from a liberal perspective. Nonetheless, the differences in the two perceptions may be due
to either intentional or unintentional misrepresentation. Failing to identify the root of the
competing representations of China’s intentions could result in even more deterioration in U.S.China relations. Misperception could be wholly unintentional, as American experts who believe
in the structural threat would feel increasingly threatened because of an increasing Chinese naval

14

Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Crisis," Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978): 93,
doi:10.2307/2149052.
15
Nadège Rolland, Chinas Eurasian Century?: Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road
Initiative (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 109.
16
Rolland, Chinas Eurasian Century?: Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, 116
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presence to safeguard Chinese investment abroad. Yet, it is also possible that the
misrepresentation is intentional, as the American government tries to earn strategic advantages
by manipulating the rhetoric of threat perception to influence Chinese policy.
Different perceptions or misperceptions have always existed, but the serious implications
of such differences between two world powers make it incumbent upon us that we do what we
can do to avoid the Thucydides’ Trap. Otherwise, misperceptions, plus assumptions of a zerosum structural challenge, could significantly degenerate the stability of the U.S.-China relations,
and regional or even global peace. In the case of BRI, for example, America would question
whether the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are prioritized in BRI projects, and thus
displacing American firms in the region.17 Consequently, the American government might seek
to minimize the China challenge to itself by delaying or disrupting the full implementation of
China’s objectives. From the Chinese perspective, such actions would be extremely dangerous
for China’s objectives and the success of BRI. The Chinese government would likely implement
countermeasures. This vicious cycle would make the Thucydides’ Trap unavoidable.
BRI is only one of many examples where America and China appear to interpret China’s
actions differently. Its financing engine, the recently-established Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), is open to similar discrepancies in interpretation. And conflictual perceptions go
well beyond the economic and financial sector. Security-wise, China’s recent moves in the South
China Sea, its military modernization, and the construction of its first military supply base in
Djibouti all contribute to the same tensions. And, in the diplomatic field, as China assumes a
larger role in global governance and participates more actively in multilateral institutions, the

17

Joshua P. Meltzer, "China's One Belt One Road Initiative: A View from the United States," Brookings, June 28,
2017, accessed November 30, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-aview-from-the-united-states/.
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U.S. likewise perceives a threat to its authority. The U.S. has summarized these behaviors as
expansionist, accusing China of disturbing the existing international order. In contrast, China
claims that its behaviors are legitimate and well within international norms, not to mention
defensive in essence. With China’s all around rise, misconceptions seem to permeate and
reinforce the potential structural conflict between the two countries.
For any international observer of the great power dynamics, conflict avoidance is
definitely a central field of focus. To search for answers, we must clearly identify where the
problems lie. As discussed above, we must determine whether China and the U.S. truly hold
different assumptions about Chinese foreign policy, where the difference in their perceptions lie,
whether there exists any misperception, and, if there is, whether the misrepresentation is
intentional or unintentional. The rest of the paper will focus on addressing the problem of
perception and misperception of the Chinese foreign policy. Once we can identify what dictates
American and Chinese perceptions, we can offer aspirational policy recommendations to
improve U.S.-China relations. We can ensure that no misjudgment will amplify the structural
conflict between China and America, and thus reduce the chance of undesirable outcomes of
Thucydides’ Trap. But more important, these policy recommendations could help build
confidence, improve bilateral relations, and even achieve a positive sum result.
The second chapter introduces the theoretical background of perception and
misperception in international politics, especially that of threat perception. Threat perception
consists of two stages: observation and appraisal. In this theory chapter we mainly focus on the
appraisal parts: how do countries consolidate their perceptions of Chinese foreign policy?
Traditional security scholars would focus on two factors: capacity and intention. Our theoretical
framework, based on up-to-date threat perception theories, will enlist five variables that

9

influence perceptions through either capacity or intention, or both. The five variables are rooted
in disparities and changes in power, similarity and difference in identity, the change in norms or
rules, historical experience, and (lack of) information. In the appraisal process, misperceptions
happen frequently. Based on current literature, several heuristic filters are introduced that will
later help us identify whether any misperception of either American or Chinese perceptions
exists. The heuristic filters include security dilemma, status dilemma, centralization,
overestimation of one’s importance, the influence of desires and fears, and cognitive dissonance.
Understanding the pattern of perceptions and misperceptions can help us assess the accuracy of
American and Chinese perceptions.
The third chapter will be the model chapter, establishing the empirical evidence for
analysis. The chapter is aimed at comparing and contrasting the specific Chinese actions in
foreign policy, the American perception, and the Chinese perception. The first half of the chapter
sets the tone, by giving the background of how China has climbed up the ladder of the global
community, and what China and the U.S. think of China’s rising. In the second half, the main
comparative framework is laid out, comparing objective observations, the American perception,
and the Chinese perception along the dimensions of China’s bilateral relations, multilateral
diplomacy, security, and economic engagement. In each dimension, the three views are
systematically compared. The model not only aims to show the key differences between the
American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese foreign policy, but also compares both
perceptions with the objective narration. The former helps one to understand how the two nations
understand the same incidents differently, thus showing the amount of disagreement between
both nations. The latter contributes to understanding the accuracy of both perceptions, therefore
discerning biases of both perceptions (either against or in favor of China). This chapter will lay
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bare key differences that will be the empirical foundation of final analysis and aspirational policy
prescriptions.
The fourth and fifth chapters will be devoted two cases studies: one on the South China
Sea, and the other on the Belt and Road Initiative, both of which are in accordance with the three
criteria of the observation stage of the perception theory. The reasons for presenting these two
mini-studies are twofold. First, both cases are important in Chinese foreign policy and speak to
several dimensions of foreign policy. Second, through the mini-studies, the model developed in
Chapter Three can be applied and used to derive policy recommendations. These detailed
accounts will contribute to specific measures to foster a better understanding of Chinese foreign
policy for the U.S., as well as a better understanding of each other’s perception between the two
nations.
In the last chapter, the theoretical and empirical evidence drawn from Chapters 2 and 3
are combined, shedding light on the variables that dictate American and Chinese perceptions.
The overall analysis will help answer several questions emerged in the introduction: Is American
perception of Chinese foreign policy accurate? How threatening is China to the U.S.? Does the
U.S. or China misperceive what China has been doing? Are misrepresentations intentional or
unintentional? How have these perceptions and misperceptions changed the calculation of both
nations? In short, what can China and the U.S. can do to improve bilateral relations and avoid the
zero-sum fate of Thucydides’ Trap?
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Chapter 2 – Laying the Theoretical Ground
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the case wherein America and China interpret the flagship of
Chinese foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), vastly differently. The Chinese
government champions its creation as part of the regime’s support for globalization, claiming
that it will help connect the Eurasian landmass. In contrast, the American government pays the
most attention to how BRI may provide China with strategic advantages over the U.S. and its
allies, including justification for setting up a military base in Djibouti next to America’s. The
U.S. perceives China’s allegedly benign initiatives as threats to American interests. Unfriendly
reactions follow opposing interpretations: The U.S. government has overtly and covertly
impeded its European allies from jumping on the bandwagon of Chinese economic integration
and has criticized Chinese security and military actions for destabilizing Asia. Additionally, the
disparities between Beijing’s and Washington’s perceptions is apparent across a range of foreign
policies. China and the U.S. have dissimilar or totally distinct views on China’s military buildup
in the South China Sea, its restrained attitude towards denuclearization in North Korea, the
Liaoning aircraft carrier’s voyage to Western Pacific, and many other activities that China
perceives as legitimate and defensive whereas the U.S. perceives them as threatening and
expansionist. U.S.-China interactions are thus consistent with Raymond Cohen’s previously
mentioned observation: “Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action
and reaction in international [politics].”18 In order to analyze whether American and Chinese
perceptions—and representations—of Chinese foreign policy are accurate, this chapter will
introduce perception theories to provide a theoretical platform through which empirical evidence
can be examined. By drawing from different authors, this chapter will present a two-stage

18

Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Crisis," 94.
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framework where threat perceptions are determined by the influence of five major variables on
the perception of capability and intention.

(Theoretical Framework Graph)
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According to Raymond Cohen, the perception of threat involves two stages.19 The first
stage is observation, when cues are received by people. Cues can be verbal or nonverbal, from
presidential statements or newspaper articles, to military dispatches or withdrawal of
ambassadors. The receiver’s selection of cues depends on three central criteria: geography, the
“present state of affairs”, and sense of vulnerability. Observers interpret and try to rationalize the
events happening around them every day. Geographical criterion means that when certain events
happen in places with “immense strategic, historic, and sentimental importance,” observers are

19

Ibid, 95.
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more likely to pick up on the cues.20 The “present state of affairs” criterion refers to the fact that
perceivers are apt to be drawn to events with ongoing mistrust and tension.21 A sense of
vulnerability means that there are certain areas in which observers perceive stronger threats from
opponents than others.22
These criteria dominate which cues are perceived. Thus, the nationalization of
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by the Japanese government in 2014, Tsai Ing-wen’s election in Taiwan
in 2016, the international tribunal ruling over the South China Sea dispute in 2016, and the
Donglang/Doklam standoff near the China-India border in 2017 each touched a sensitive nerve
for Beijing. Similarly, as previously mentioned, China’s military buildup in the South China Sea,
its restrained attitude towards denuclearization in North Korea, and the Liaoning aircraft carrier’s
voyage to Western Pacific all make the U.S. anxious.
The second stage of threat perception, as explained by Cohen, is appraisal, wherein
people evaluate whether they are threatened or not. For the purposes of this paper, the center
analysis of both the American and Chinese perceptions will be built around the appraisal stage.
Complementary to Cohen is Janice G. Stein’s work, in which she argues that threat perception is
a function of two factors, capacity and intention.23 Capacity determines whether one actor has the
ability to attack another, and intention represents whether one actor wants to attack another, but
what’s at stake is the interplay between the variables. When one country possesses the intention
but not the capacity to harm another, it is usually seen as a bluff. If the supreme leader of North
Korea claimed it was about to launch a nuclear attack against its alleged enemies in the 1990s,

20

Ibid, 96.
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013, 2,
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0012.
21
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his provocation would more likely have been seen as verbal aggression. When one country has
capacity, but not the intention, to attack another, different theoretical schools of thought diverge
on the outcome. Classical realists who assume “capability shapes intention” would perceive a
country with capacity as threatening. In comparison, liberals who focus more on analyzing the
interests of actors and institutional influence, and constructivists who care more about selfconception and its offshoot self-fulfilling prophecies, argue that capacity is not the only factor of
threat perception.24 Nonetheless, when both factors are present in a country’s behavior, all
schools agree that threat perception reaches its apex.
Capacity and intention are broad and lack enough nuances. Thus, it is worthwhile to
consider the relevant variables introduced by realist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought,
since these can permeate countries’ perceptions of other countries’ policies, as policymakers in
each country have diverse backgrounds and assumptions. As mentioned above, based on the
current literature, there are five explanatory variables influencing threat perception through their
influence over a country’s capacity, intention, or both: the variables are rooted in disparities in
power and changes in relative power, identity, and the change in rules or norms, historical
experiences, and (lack of) information. Academics have offered explanations of threat perception
that rely on each of these as the filter between observation and appraisal. Each of these
contributes to perceptions of threat that are more or less consistent with reality. However, some
empirical evidence has shown us a lack of full alignment between perceptions and reality, thus,
in addition to the perceptions rooted in the five variables, there is also intentional signaling and
misrepresentation mucking up the works. On the one hand, threats are often manipulated as a
means of deterrence and defense; intentional misrepresentation may serve some signaling

24

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2017), xxvii; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role, 18.
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functions, and thus, it is hard to change if a country deems this strategy useful. On the other
hand, misperceptions do exist, and they should be corrected to reduce the communication
failures between countries and protect bilateral relations. After describing each of the five
variables below, they will be examined for misperceptions using several heuristic filters. These
filters include the security dilemma, status dilemma, centralization, overestimation of one’s
importance, the influence of fears and desires, and cognitive dissonance.
The first major variable is power and its change in relation to that of other countries.25
The power variable influence the level of threat perception through its impact on the capacity
factor. Power is a relative concept. As a relative concept, one country’s power can either force or
persuade another country to act in the interest of the former. As argued by David L. Rousseau
and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of
power asymmetries between groups.”26 When the latter country feels its position given certain
issues has changed, its original goals have reset, or its preferences have been shaped even
without much resistance, it feels the coercion and perceives whoever exerts this power as
threatening. A classic example demonstrating how power determines threat perception would be
the dynamics between American and Chinese military forces right after the foundation of the
current People’s Republic. When the Communist Party tried to defeat the fled Kuomintang in
Taiwan in 1950, Washington decided to intervene for the interests of the capitalist bloc after
taking into account the outbreak of the Korean War. With the introduction of the seventh fleet,
the disadvantaged People’s Liberation Army was not able to cross the Taiwan Strait. Originally
set to reunify Taiwan immediately, China gave up its goal of reunification as China saw that the

25

David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 744, doi:10.1177/0022002707304813.
26
Ibid, 744-746.
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military power asymmetry between the U.S. and China was threatening to the Beijing
government.
The power influence of threat perception is a reciprocal idea. The disappearance of power
advantage generates the same feeling of a threat as the appearance or the use of power, and the
unease now falls to the other side. When the weaker country becomes stronger, the existing
greater power often realizes that their original power projection does not function in the same
way as before. When a shift in the power dynamics between two countries sends the stronger
country a signal that the weaker country has the momentum to overcome the originally stronger
country, the stronger country is afraid of losing its superior power and considers the weaker
country dangerous because it now challenges the existing regional or global leadership. In other
words, the loss of relative advantage in terms of power, as well as the loss of hegemony, is itself
upsetting. Consider the last example. When the seventh fleet was stationed in the Taiwan Strait
in the 1950s, China could not harm any American battleship, let alone achieve unification.
Presently, however, Chinese missiles are deployed along the coastline in Fujian, which is the part
of the mainland right next to Taiwan, and are combat-ready to challenge perceived threatening
actors. Although not directly endangering U.S. homeland security, decision-makers in
Washington need to consider the risk of Chinese retaliation if they decide to intervene in another
Taiwan Strait crisis. Furthermore, China’s capability to retaliate through bilateral economic
interdependence means that the repercussions from another intervention could go beyond
military reaction. The joint aftermath translates into an effective deterrence that challenges
American hegemony. The reciprocal characteristic of the power variable, thus, signifies that both
expansion and contraction of a relative power gap can lead to threat perception. Although all
schools of threat perception theory believe power matters, realist theorists often highlight the

17

predominant influence of power. For realists, a change in capacity by itself is significant enough,
since an increase in power means an increase in the likelihood of aggressive intention.
However, constructivists such as Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero identified another
variable—identity. Unlike the realist framework where power represents intention, the
constructivist framework believes that identity, an explanatory variable independent of power,
speaks to the intention factor of threat perception separately. Both social identity theory and selfcategorization theory underscore the distinction between “us” and “them,” stressing the boundary
between “the ingroup and the outgroup.”27 This “us” versus “them” mentality is often built by
fundamental characteristics of the institution and society, such as regime type, economic
structure, and demographics.28 Constructivists believe that “a shared sense of identity can reduce
perceptions of intergroup threat.”29 So, the more similar two countries are, the less likely the two
perceive each other as a threat. For example, through a comparison between the U.S. and Japan,
David Rousseau explains that the two countries’ identities are similar because they are both
capitalist democracies, even though Japan is a nation-state and the U.S. is not. Their similarity
predicts their close relations. In the case of China and the U.S., the two differ in most ways.
China is a one-party authoritarian nation-state with a population comprised of more than 90
percent ethnic Han people. It champions state intervention in political, economic, societal and
civil issues. In comparison, the U.S. is a bicameral federal capitalist democracy whose citizens
come from diverse backgrounds. In international politics, the U.S. helped establish the postWWII global order and has been the vested interest since then. China, on the other hand, is not
among the traditional Western powers, and as a result, it hopes to modify the international
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system in its favor. From this comparison, Beijing and Washington should have much less shared
identity than that between Washington and Tokyo.
Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero argue that the power and identity variables do not merely
produce an additive result. They find an interactive or multiplicative relationship between the
two. Their experimental study has found a positive and statistically significant value for the
interactive variable he creates. “Specific combinations of power and identity produced an
increase in threat perception more than the simply additive impact of each independent
variable.”30 That means that, if the U.S. sees that China becomes increasingly powerful and that
the identity disparity between China and itself is huge, the U.S. should feel much more
threatened by China than the effect of only having either power increase or identity disparity.
The constructivist multiplication effect, thus, can render stronger threat perception than what is
likely under a realist paradigm under the same circumstance.
The third variable of threat perception, borrowing from Raymond Cohen’s threat
perception framework, is the discomfort that comes when one country changes the rules of the
game or does not abide by commonly-held norms, an argument that is consistent with the liberal
focus of interests and institutions. Rules and norms define what a country can and cannot do
given the current institutional framework either regionally or globally. The institutional
framework can take explicit forms such as international laws or bilateral agreements, or implicit
forms like traditions or tacit agreements. Whichever form they take, rules and norms function as
a communication tool among state actors and coordinate each other’s behavior.31 In the practical
world where coordination costs are high, countries abide by previously agreed-upon rules in
order to manage their expectations of one another’s actions. Even for countries whose power and
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identity variables indicate that they have totally opposite interests, rules and norms ensure that
they can maintain a peaceful coexistence. But when the norms or rules are broken, each
country’s expectation of the other has been distorted because countries do not know what to
expect from others, and thus, they have to prepare for the worst outcome. Mutual trust falls
because rules and norms that serve as constraints to all parties are missing, and threat perception
heightens accordingly. During the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States both
had enormous power and shared no similarity in identity, the two could maintain peace largely
thanks to the negotiated post-World War II order that resulted from the Yalta Conference.
Although major parties involved were not happy about the concessions they had to make during
negotiations, they nevertheless reached a balance that all parties agreed to. However, the Cuban
Missile Crisis is an example of defection to the expectation of each other. No longer constrained
by previous norms of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
had to prepare for the worst, the precipitation of a potential nuclear-level confrontation.
Fortunately, Gorbachev backtracked and honored the tacit agreement of the existing division of
spheres of influence again. He communicated his re-addiction to the old rules successfully to
Washington by shipping the nuclear weapons back to Moscow.
The change in rules and norms is often expressed through trespasses of existing rules or
norms by a country. Unlike power and identity which are more objective, a change in rules or
norms could be intentional or unintentional. When a country becomes increasingly powerful, it
may give rise to distortion in its behaviors that violate some rules or norms. In this case, the
change or violation is unintentional. Nonetheless, changing behaviors does not require a change
in power or identity. By no longer abiding by certain rules or norms, countries often tend to
signal others through their uncommon actions. When acting alone, a change in rules or norms
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signals changes in a country’s intention. From a pragmatic theoretical perspective, this variable
should matter more as a policy tool in reducing tensions between the U.S. and China. Given the
fact that the power gap between China and the U.S. has narrowed, and the disparity in their
identities are huge, both the U.S. and China should be careful in their foreign policy. Similar to
the case between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the expectation of each other will drop
significantly if one or the other fails to abide by existing rules or norms. Consequently, it is
important for each to manage the threat perception of the other through clearly following rules
and norms. The change in rules or norms should be an important variable over which both
countries should have more control.
The fourth variable that influences threat perception is history. As Robert Jervis argues,
people learn from history and form a picture based on what they learn because, “by making
accessible insights derived from previous events, analogies provide a useful shortcut to
rationality.”32 In a rapidly changing world, central decision-makers need to filter noises in order
to make judgments quickly. Cognitive consistency facilitates the consolidation of historical
images despite limited cases studied, as “we tend to believe that countries we like do things we
like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries that we oppose; [and] we tend to think that
countries that our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the interests of our
friends, and aid our opponents.”33 History shapes how people think, even when enough nuances
are presented. Long-standing hostility between France and Germany between the eighteenth and
twentieth centuries demonstrates how historical memory increases the perception of aggression
between countries, despite the constant evolution of relations between those countries.
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History influences threat perceptions not only through shaping people’s thought
processes but also by serving as a comparison between the past and the present. Through this
latter form, the history variable interacts and even amplifies with the effects of power and the
change in rules or norms variables. Decision-makers may compare the past and the present level
of power. The interaction between the history variable and the change of rules or norms variable
would derive decision-makers’ expectation to foreign countries’ future behaviors. Both
comparison and expectation require a historical perspective of threat perception, which could
significant influence one’s perception of others. In sum, history highly correlates with other
variables and influences threat perception by itself as well as by its interacting with other
variables. Sino-Japanese relations is a classic example of when history had a huge impact on
threat perception. During “the century of humiliation,” China first was defeated by Japan in the
First Sino-Japanese war during 1894 to 1895. Since then, Japan has controlled a huge part of
China during the first half of 20th century, including most famously, Manchuria. By leaving
China a narrative of victimhood, China has been always highly alerted by any improvement of
the Japanese military. Even today, whenever Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister, pushes
for pacifist constitution reform, China is extremely vocal and worries about the rise of revisionist
power in Japan. Similarly, China’s predominance over Japan during the medieval period made
Japan extremely worried about China as China became stronger. Taking this all into account,
historical interaction renders China and Japan with deep mistrust. Threat perception of each other
based on the historical experience, as a result, is high.
The fifth and last variable of threat perception is information, or the lack of it.
Information is important for estimating the capacity and intention of state actors. Rationalist
accounts believe that incomplete information creates uncertainty, which leads to the rise of threat
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perception. Some countries have incentives to hide information because they are afraid of an
exhibition of weakness or a revelation of true intentions. Saddam Hussein was required by UN
Resolution 687 to dismantle all his weapons of mass destruction. He carried out the Resolution
as instructed, but he did not want to appear soft in front of Iran. So, he intentionally bluffed his
neighbor at the international stage. Similarly, North Korea previously had incentives to hide its
real nuclear capability, hoping that the U.S. could be deterred by its nuclear tests. In both cases,
information was manipulated in order to achieve strategic ends. However, a lack of information
heightens threat perception; deliberate misrepresentation, unfortunately, often results in the
opposite result.
The five variables discussed above determine threat perception through affecting either
the perception of a country’s capacity, that of its intention, or both. Then, I am going to introduce
common errors of perceptions based on the study of Janice G. Stein and Robert Jervis. These will
serve as heuristic filters to examine the empirical evidences provided in the following chapters.
The first heuristic filter for misperception, introduced by Stein, is the status dilemma. A status
dilemma presents a scenario in which “two countries would be satisfied with their status if they
had perfect information about each other’s belief.”34 Because of incomplete information and
uncertainty felt by the observer, the observer perceives a larger threat and prefers to take
measures to protect itself. Stein further argues that a status dilemma often leads to the second
common error, the security dilemma. A security dilemma happens when both countries are
security seekers: when country A decides to take on defensive measures to safeguard its
interests, country B finds A’s defensive measures disturbing and takes on more.35 A spiral effect
of the security dilemma will then make both countries more insecure. Note, while the status
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dilemma is solely associated with the information variable, the spiraling security dilemma can be
applied to other variables as well, especially the power variable. The arms race of the Cold War
is an example of the security dilemma.
In addition to Stein’s status and security dilemmas, Robert Jervis also notes four common
misperceptions. They are centralization, overestimation of one’s importance, the influence of
desires and fears, and cognitive dissonance. According to Jervis, Centralization refers to the
misperception that one country will understand the “behavior of others as more centralized,
planned, and coordinated than it is. This is a manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex and
unrelated events into a coherent pattern.”36 Because decision-makers tend to overestimate how
much foreign counterparts know about them and their government, they would more likely
associate foreign actions with their domestic situation. Simultaneously, they often
underappreciate how foreign governments need to consider other factors, including domestic
factors of the foreign government and the influence of third parties. Consistent with this selfcentered bias, countries tend to overestimate their importance as influences or targets in the
decision of others.37 Perceivers tend to believe that other countries inflict harm on them because
of these countries’ aggression and hostility. In reality, however, they often fail to understand that
the actions of foreign countries are responses to perceivers. Both centralization and
overestimation of one’s importance highlight the self-bias of innocence.
To a certain degree, Jervis argues that the self-bias of innocence reflects the desires and
fears of the perceiver because of human’s nature of cognitive consistency and the centrality
nature of perception. Cognitive consistency and centrality translate to the fact that perception is
hard to change; once the threat is perceived, the perceiver may take a long time and a great
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amount of efforts to reduce the perception of threat. Jervis summarized eight reasons or excuses
why leaders often find it difficult to change perceptions.38 People tend to overlook new
information when it contradicts to their original perception.39 It could take the form of a failure
to notice the information or a purposeful misunderstanding of its original intent. If they do
recognize the contradiction, people tend to question the validity of the information before
accepting it, or question the source of the information.40 When validity is no longer a problem,
people prefer to describe the new information as unexplainable, or find competing evidence to
support their old perceptions or undermine the new information.41 If the new information survive
the examination of all previous excuses, then people will either split up the new information and
discredit the false part, or build the new information into a larger picture that is disturbing.42
Either way, to discredit the new information that could potentially alter the old perception,
people try to connect it with problematic arguments or perceptions. Cognitive consistency
becomes a problem when the confirmation bias of perceivers becomes too strong. In such a case,
when they face cognitive dissonance where perceivers fail to rationalize others’ actions with
their previous belief, they tend to reduce dissonance and achieve consistency by distorting or
avoiding some information.43 In addition, “desires and fears have the most impact when the
perception matters least—the actor has no incentives to perceive accurately because the actor
cannot act on what he believes will happen.”44 All four misperceptions Jervis raises, under this
circumstance, are likely to persist altogether.
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With the five variables and six heuristic filters of misperception in mind, we are ready to
look into empirical evidence of American and Chinese perceptions in the next Chapter, after
which the theoretical framework will be applied to two case studies and the overall Chinese
foreign policy.
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Chapter 3 – The Model Chapter
The goal of this chapter is to compare and contrast the difference between three
perspectives: the objective narration, the Chinese perception, and the American perception. The
objective narration will outline major achievements in Chinese foreign policy. I will only discuss
the concrete significance of these developments that can be verified. The Chinese perception will
mostly cover how the Chinese government sees the development of Chinese foreign policy.
Similarly, the sections on the American perception will give a nuanced illustration of how the
United States views Chinese foreign policy. Because of the “revolving door” system of
American politics, major U.S. scholars influence the U.S. perspective in ways that their Chinese
counterparts do not. Therefore, the American sources analyzed here include not only government
reports and presidential speeches, but also the opinions of major China experts in the United
States. Some experts may have served in the government, or have had interactions with
Washington for a significant amount of time; others simply are influential enough to swing how
the field views U.S.-China relations.
This comparison will be carried out first holistically, and then in four dimensions. I will
first give the background for each perspective and summarize major historical events that have
led to the current perspective. Then the first dimension will cover the development of China’s
bilateral relations with major countries and regions in the world, including its relations with the
U.S., Russia, its neighbors, and major blocs of the world. The second dimension will be China’s
multilateral relations and its role in regional and global institutions. The third dimension will
focus on China’s development in the security arena, as well as its stances on major security
issues in the region. The development of the People’s Liberation Army will also be discussed.
The last dimension will focus on China’s economic engagement with the rest of the world, as
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well as its flagship policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI, as well as with its
financing sources, attracts the world’s attention and receives different perceptions in the U.S.
than it does in China. By comparing and contrasting the Chinese and American perceptions on
Chinese foreign policy, as well as how each differs from a more objective description, this
chapter will contribute to understanding where major disagreements are grounded and where
policy recommendations are needed.

I. The Background
1. The Objective Narration
The foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China had a rough start. The Cold War
started as the young republic was founded. Due to the split in political ideology, China fell into
the Soviet Union-led communist regime. It was thus disconnected from the first world. During
the first thirty years of its development, China was mostly inward-looking and carried out several
falsely directed campaigns. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution attracted very
few countries to befriend China. It was not until the end of the Cultural Revolution, the opening
up and reform, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and a series of domestic and international events
that China started to emerge at the international stage. There are two major turning points for
China’s diplomacy: first, at the 1976th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly
on October 25, 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed to recognize the People’s Republic as the only
legitimate representatives of China. Second, the United States transferred its diplomatic
recognition from the Republic of China government in Taipei to the People’s Republic in
Beijing. With both domestic reforms and diplomatic victories, China’s foreign relations went
into a stage of rapid development.
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Despite the 1989 crackdown at the Tiananmen Square that endangered China’s foreign
relations briefly, its overall development has been vigorous. Today, more than 175 countries
have diplomatic relations with China.45 Furthermore, it has become highly active in regional and
global institutions. After joining the World Trade Organization, China has become the largest
exporter and the second largest importer in world trade (merchandise) by 2016.46 As one of five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China has also participated in many
peacekeeping missions abroad and led the Six-Party Talks to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis.
In addition to its involvement in existing institutions, China has also led the creation of BRICS,
the informal institution of emerging markets, and launched the Belt and Road Initiative, and its
financing bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Besides opportunities, China also faces regional and global economic and security
challenges. Domestic economic pressure has heightened. After initial demographic dividends
have almost been depleted, China needs to deepen its economic reform to search for new drivers.
Internationally, the United States has backtracked on its leadership in global economic
integration, as isolationism and protectionism have grown in other countries as well. In January
2017, U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership right after his
inauguration.47 Seven months later, he withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement.48 At the
same time, China faced serious security challenges near its border. The nationalization of
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Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by the Japanese government in 2014, Tsai Ing-wen’s election in Taiwan
in 2016, the international tribunal ruling over the South China Sea dispute in 2016, and the
Donglang/Doklam standoff near the China-India border in 2017 each touched a sensitive nerve.
With rising tensions and committed security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, Australia, and
India, Beijing could find itself entangled easily in conflicts with others. In sum, the historical
events and the current international political environment provides China both challenges and
opportunities.

2. The Chinese Perspective
To study the Chinese perspective of the Chinese foreign policy, it is important to look
back far enough to include China’s early contact with the West during the Qing dynasty. After
the industrial revolution, the productivity of the western countries improved significantly; in
comparison, the Qing dynasty dwarfed by more than half a century. Nonetheless, due to the
isolationist policies Qing emperors conducted, Qing officials and elites were not aware of
China’s relative weak position to the West. It was not until the first Opium War when Qing
China was defeated by Britain swiftly did the Qing court realize how far it was lagged behind.
From 1839 to 1945, China experienced the darkest century according to the Chinese history
textbook. Several wars broke out and China lost all except for the World War II; many unequal
treaties were signed; war compensation was paid in silver and gold with a huge amount; several
pieces of land were ceded to western imperialists. It was not until the victory of the World War II
did China finally expel all foreign powers from its territory (except for Hong Kong and Macau).
The idea of “century of humiliation,” despite its end in 1945, has been ingrained in
Chinese elites and the public since then. The Communist government mobilized the victimhood
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narrative and adopted a strategy of “active defense” to defend its sovereignty. In 1950, just a year
after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong championed the “active
defense” strategy and crossed the Yalu River when he believed that the U.S.-led UN force
threatened the survival of the young republic. Again, in 1969, he carried out a preemptive strike
over the disputed Zhenbao island near the Sino-Russian border. After the opening up and reform,
the “active strategy,” though mentioned even less frequently, has persisted. With regard to the
provocative behavior of Vietnam, the independence movement in Taiwan, and the islands
dispute in East and South China Seas, the Chinese government continued taking actions to
ensure that its positions in different issues were well-taken by its opponents.
After Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and reform in the late 1970s, China needed a more
peaceful environment to catch up its economy. China has taken a more peaceful rhetoric that
highlights how economic engagement can create mutually beneficial relations with the rest of the
world. Deng Xiaoping, the chief designer of China’s economic revival, proposed a 24-character
guiding principle for China’s foreign policy: “observe calmly, secure our position, cope with
affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and
never claim leadership.”49 Such a guiding principle carried on the low-key tradition of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by China’s first Premier, Zhou Enlai. Although
China’s economy has blossomed since then, senior Chinese officials periodically reaffirmed
Beijing’s intention to stick to a peaceful rise. In 2005, Zheng Bijian, a senior Communist Party
official, wrote in Foreign Affairs that “China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world
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affairs.”50 In 2011, Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo confirmed that “peaceful development
is a strategic choice China has made.”51
Since Xi Jinping became the Secretary General of the Communist Party of China (CCP)
after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 and the President of People’s Republic of China
in March 2013, he has been at the center of Chinese politics. Having “two centenary goals” and
the mission of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese dream in mind, the Party leadership aims to
“[take] into account both China’s domestic and international interests, [attach] importance to
both development and security,” and “[pursue] major-country diplomacy with distinctive
Chinese features.”52 Nowadays, Beijing emphasized the backwardness of the international
system, arguing that the global order should be updated to ensure that it reflects the increasing
weight of emerging market.53 The current Chinese government, which seldom mentions Deng’s
guiding principles, believes that “hide and bide” should not apply in the same way as before.54
Beijing needs to take a larger responsibility in ensuring a peaceful global order that is up-to-date
and reflects Beijing’s interests.

3. The American Perspective
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To start off the American perspective of the Chinese foreign policy, one should always
remind oneself the assumptions that has made in the early stage of U.S-China engagement. After
the normalization of U.S.-China relations, China has adopted a set of economic reforms, which
liberated its economy in unprecedented ways. China pundits in America believed that, to make
China a more advanced economy, the Chinese government would carry out more economic
reforms, and further liberated both political and economic institutions.55 Thus, Washington
pursues a strategy of engagement in the hope that, by inviting China to the international
community, the U.S. and the international community will be able to make China more liberal;
China would be so interconnected with the West that backtracking would be not only unwelcome
but also impossible. And such a result would strengthen the global order that was built by
America.
The 1990 National Security Strategy (NSS), signed by U.S. President George H. W.
Bush, openly showed Washington’s willingness to adopt such an engagement policy. The 1990
NSS “described [China’s] enhanced ties with the world as ‘crucial to China’s prospects for
regaining the path of economic reform.’”56 The Clinton Administration continued Bush’s
strategy to China and expanded it to the security dimension. The 1995 NSS said that the United
States would “strongly promote China’s participation in regional security mechanism to reassure
its neighbors and assuage its own security concerns.”57 Increasing bilateral connections in all
dimensions followed these statements, though economic and civil connections outpaced security
engagement.
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After two decades of engagement, however, the United States does not see a politically,
economically, and socially liberal China that is closer to what it expected. The current Chinese
system, which disappoints the White House and the Capitol, is doing just fine in terms of
economic growth. More than that, because China has become economically stronger, its political
and military power also expands rapidly. Now China has the capacity to potentially challenge the
international system established since the end of World War II. The pressure on Washington has
grown significantly. In the most recent 2017 National Security Strategy, the U.S. admits that its
China policy was not successful.
“For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise
and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China.
Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of
others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its
authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the
most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is
growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic
expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s
world-class universities.”58
The U.S. perceives Chinese foreign policy in all dimensions as a challenge to the U.S. interests,
and considers many of China’s actions provocative. The report views China, along with Russia, a
“strategic competitor” to the U.S., returning to a phrase that was only used during the early
George W. Bush administration last time.
At the strategy level, the U.S. increasingly sees China as a challenger and threat. At the
tactics level, the current U.S. government summarizes the actions of Chinese foreign policy into
two categories: charm offensive, a term created by Council on Foreign Relations scholar Joshua
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Kurlantzick, and coercion.59 According to the 2017 Annual Report to Congress of the U.S-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, charm offensive is embodied by the Belt and Road
Initiative through which China grows its influence overseas. Coercion is a more self-explanatory
means that China used near its territory, such as using its coast guards to expel fishermen from
its neighbor countries. Most recently, two scholars from the National Endowment for
Democracy, Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, coined the term sharp power to describe
Chinese behaviors.60 Inspired by the idea of soft power, sharp power referred to the reliance on
“subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self-censorship.”61 They believed
that China, with the help of sharp power, will compel behavior at home and manipulate opinion
abroad. Harvard Professor Joseph Nye illustrated China’s employment of sharp power through
China Radio International’s support of foreign radios to promote Chinese interests abroad.62
Including key officials in the Trump administration, most scholars on China in the U.S.
now possess a zero-sum assumption and call for a tougher U.S. stance on China. After two
decades of waiting, they did not see the change from China that will make two countries’
interests align. Nonetheless, some scholars still believe that positive sum is likely to occur and is
conducive to future U.S.-China relations. Although they believe that China does promote its
influence abroad with unacceptable means, they are also worried about the backlash of shutting
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down all Chinese soft power tools.63 Michael Swaine, the China expert at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, also criticized an oversimplified argument that called China
a threat.64 To solve many critical issues such as climate change or North Korean nuclear crisis,
they believe China and the U.S. have shared interests with fundamental significance. In the
current administration, the chance is near zero that such a position will prevail in the American
perspective.

II. Bilateral Relations
1. The Objective Narration
China’s rise in all dimensions has received the world’s attention. In many figures, China
has quickly surpassed Japan and many traditional European countries and approached closely to
the United States. The United States, as the single global power, bears the brunt of such a
phenomenon. The Obama administration was fully aware of the importance of China’s
ascension. To many’s surprise, President Hu Jintao and President Obama had their first meeting
in China during Obama’s first year in office in November 2009.65 After President Xi of China
took office, in June 2013, the American and Chinese presidents met at the Sunnylands estate in
Southern California where China’s proposal of building a “new model of major power relations”
received some consensus from both sides.66 The proposal contains three major parts: no conflict
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or confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. The communication between the U.S.
and China increased significantly during the Obama-Xi period. Areas of collaboration expanded
as well: trade, regional security, climate change, cybersecurity and so on.
During the Xi-Trump era, China’s relations with the U.S. marked a diplomatically
friendly yet practically unfriendly turn. In April 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted his
first meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. At the end of the meeting, they jointly
declared to upgrade the strategic and economic dialogue during Obama’s administration to a
comprehensive dialogue that includes four pillars, including the diplomatic and security
dialogue, the comprehensive economic dialogue, the law enforcement and cybersecurity
dialogue, and social and cultural issues dialogue.67 Despite initially cordial contacts between the
two presidents, tensions have been on the rise, especially in trade. In the first two months of
2018, there have been several commercial acquisitions that were blocked by the U.S.
governments. On January 2, 2018, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
blocked Ant Financial’s acquisition of MoneyGram on national security grounds, giving a major
blow to the internet giant Alibaba who owns Ant Financial. A month later on February 15, the
Securities and Exchange Commission of the U.S. federal government halted the sale of the
Chicago Stock Exchange to Chinese investors.68 A week later, another Chinese acquisition of a
U.S. semiconductor testing company was blocked.69
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Sino-Russian relations, another major bilateral relationship that Beijing has devoted
much energy to cultivate, have advanced significantly over the past two decades. There has been
an increase in collaboration in many fields between the two countries. After the West sanctioned
Russia for its annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the Ukraine crisis, China has been the
major export destination for Russia’s natural resources and an expanding source for capital
inflow.70 In reciprocity, China has been increasing its energy reliance on Russia. From 2013 to
2016, the share of Russian oil supply in the total Chinese oil import approximately doubled.
Russia jumped from the fourth largest oil supplier to the largest one that tied with Saudi
Arabia.71 The oil industry is just one industry among many that reflects the growing
collaboration between Russia and China. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Russia in
2015, 32 cooperative documents were signed.72 Among them, there is a joint statement on
coordination between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union. Such a cooperation reflects a deep willingness between Moscow and Beijing to further
their shared interests. Besides economic cooperation, diplomatic exchanges and military
cooperation follow the tide as well. Diplomatically, Russian President Vladimir Putin met Xi at
least five times in 2017.73 Militarily, Russia resumed its sale of advanced weaponry to China
after a decade of implicit arms embargo due to China’s unlicensed copying. After Xi’s
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inaugration, Russia has sold China S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system and 24 Sukoi Su35 fighter jets. Both deals reached $8 billion USD in total.74 Such a close relationship
corresponds with the elevation of Sino-Russia relations. In 2014, both governments decided to
elevate their relations to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination, which is a
rarely used term that describes the unprecedented level of cooperation between China and Russia
so far.
In addition to the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russia relations, China also focused heavily on
developing its relations with neighboring countries. In Northeast Asia, China, South Korea and
Japan held trilateral summits perennially. However, the summit was often interrupted and
delayed by disagreements or tensions between two parties of the three. Territorial dispute
between China and Japan on Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and that between South Korea and Japan
on the Liancourt Rocks, comfort women issues between South Korea and Japan, and the
deployment of THAAD all prohibit regional cooperation and coordination.
In Southeast Asia, China had closer relations with both ASEAN and its member
countries. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was proposed by President Xi Jinping in
Indonesia. China maintained an especially congenial relations with Cambodia, helping Cambodia
build one of the largest hydroelectric power stations.75 In exchange, Cambodia blocked an
ASEAN statement that addressed ASEAN countries’ concern over the South China Sea disputes.
China offered similar assistance or economic cooperation package to other ASEAN countries. A
prominent case is one in which, after Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte reversed his
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predecessor’s position on South China Sea dispute, China gave lavish assistance to Duterte for
combating poverty and counterterrorism.
In South Asia, India and Pakistan are two important neighbors of China. China-Pakistan
relations have been elevated to all-weather strategic partnership in 2005, a unique category in the
Chinese foreign policy lexicon. The close relations between the two worries India significantly.
As China started to develop its southwest border, India’s worry continuously grew. On behalf of
Bhutan, India finally initiated a military standoff between China and India in Donglang/Doklam
region since June 2017. Although the standoff ended in August without turning into a hot
conflict, tensions between the two countries have not subsided by much.
Last but not least, China developed different levels of strategic partnerships with major
blocs or the world, including Europe, Africa, and Latin America. With notable progress, China
has expanded its bilateral partnerships to 97 different countries and regions by August 2017.76

2. The Chinese Perspective
Among all its bilateral relations, China deems its relations with great powers the most
important ones. In the past half a decade, China has consolidated its guiding principle of foreign
policy, which is the major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. From this guiding
principle, it has derived the new model (form) of major country relations between China and the
United States. First raised in 2010, it was put forward by the State Conciliator of China, Dai
Bingguo, during the second round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue.77 In 2013,
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President Obama and President Xi agreed on collaboratively building this new model.78
Gradually, China has expanded on this idea and consolidated it into the major-country diplomacy
with Chinese characteristics. As of 2017, this term has fueled the narrative of each and every
major document and speech conducted by the CCP leadership.
The proposal of the new model of major country relations between China and the U.S.
renders Sino-U.S. relations as one of the most important bilateral relations in the world. The new
model is alleged to abandon the traditional realist assumption of the balance of power between
states. In his speech in Seattle in 2015, President Xi Jinping outlined four points that he deemed
important for healthy Sino-U.S. relations.
First, we must read each other's strategy correctly. Building a new model of major
country relationship with the United States that features non-conflict, nonconfrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation79 is the priority of China's
foreign policy…Second, we must firmly advance win-win cooperation… Third, we must
manage our differences properly and effectively… Fourth, we must foster friendly
sentiments among our peoples...80
For President Xi and the Chinese government, the top priority in advancing Sino-U.S. relations is
risk control. The first and the third points call for effective communication; the second and the
fourth points emphasize strengthening economic and cultural interdependence. Through forging
effective communication and deep interdependence, the Chinese government aims to avoid
escalating tensions. As President Xi said, “there is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap
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in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic
miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”81
Beijing’s attitude towards Sino-U.S. relations is not consistent at the international and
domestic levels. While Beijing tries to push the idea of building a new type of Sino-U.S.
relations that benefit both globally, it constantly heeds the encroachment of democracy and
liberal ideas from America domestically. Chinese domestic publications often warn its citizens
that the U.S. constantly tries to westernize and fragmentize China.82 The Chinese government is
fully aware of its ambivalence towards the U.S. Yet, it has not been able to avoid it due to the
fact that both economic performance and ideological loyalty are important for the regime
survival of the Communist Party.
Russia is another great power accepted by China. Unlike its relations with the U.S.,
China-Russia relations is the exemplar of the major-country diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics. Both countries have seen each other as the priorities of foreign relations. That’s
what both said; that’s also what both did. Russia is the first foreign country Xi visited after his
inauguration in 2013; in the written statement prior to the trip, Xi said: “China will make
developing relations with Russia a priority in its foreign policy orientation.”83 In reciprocity,
Russia invited Xi to visit Russian Defense Ministry, and Putin commented that the RussianChina relations is at “the best in their centuries-long history.”84 The Chinese government
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believes that Sino-Russian relations create a win-win situation that supersedes traditional western
zero-sum theory of the balance of power. China’s collaboration with Russia is “a ballast stone for
world peace and stability.”85 Despite the close relationship, Fu Ying, the chair of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of People’s Republic of China,
representing the Chinese government, openly stated in a Foreign Affairs article that it does not
seek an alliance with the Kremlin, as the only objective for Sino-Russian relations for the
Chinese government is to work on mutually beneficial fields.86
Regarding China’s relations with its neighboring countries, Xi Jinping, in his book The
Governance of China, raised the concept of “friendship, equality, sincerity, reciprocity, and
inclusiveness” to achieve win-win outcomes.87 Despite the power asymmetry between China and
its neighbors in favor of China, Xi rejects the notion that China should be the model for other
states necessarily, and moreover, highlights China’s non-interference in other countries’
domestic affairs.88 In a similar vein, China believes that, while promoting economically
favorable conditions between China and other regions in the world, it should not sell its model
abroad and involve itself with another hegemonic power.89 With such a mindset, China has coestablished the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-ASEAN cooperation mechanism,
China-Arab Cooperation Forum, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China and Central and
Eastern European Countries’ Leaders Conference, China-Pacific Islands Forum, and ChinaCELAC Forum, covering all parts of the developing world.
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3. The American Perspective
American politicians and scholars have all recognized the rise of China. As the global
center of power moved to Asia, China’s rise attracted America’s attention and touched
Washington’s nerve at the same time. The Obama administration started with a limited
experience with China. Obama’s first presidential trip to China is his first trip there ever. Despite
having little knowledge about China, President Obama had a vision that “America should evolve
from a leader into a partner globally.”90 Obama embodied the belief that the U.S. should give
more attention to the rise of the emerging markets who could potentially change the global order.
Thus, he often stated at the beginning of his two-term presidency that America welcomes the rise
of China. His initial amiable posture gave the media a false impression that America was
forming a G-2 with China, which upset both domestic political powers and American allies and
partners in Asia-Pacific. The Trump administration has an “America First” policy that directly
formulated a negative rhetoric for U.S.-China relations. However, the Trump administration does
not have a coherent China attitude or China policy. In the economic dimension, President Trump
accused that China has stolen millions of jobs from America in multiple occasions, yet he did not
“blame” China for doing so.91 In the security dimension, President Trump swayed back and
forth, sometimes appreciating China’s help to solve the threat of North Korea, while other times
criticizing China for not pressuring Pyongyang hard enough. Overall, the Trump administration
has taken a tougher but inconsistent stance on China’s foreign policy.
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The increasingly close relations between China and Russia worry many people in
Washington and in the West in general. Studies from Washington and its related institutions
highlight two features of Sino-Russian relations that the U.S. finds particularly threatening. For
one, the U.S. believes that Sino-Russian relations have become asymmetrical, in favor of China.
Alexander Gabuev, a scholar at Carnegie Moscow Center, the Russian branch of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, represents a group of scholars who views China as the only
accessible and substantially large market for Russia after Moscow was sanctioned by the West.
The lack of alternatives gives China a leg up in Sino-Russian relations that China could compel
Russia in defending Beijing’s interests.92 This is closely linked to the second concern of
Washington: China and Russia are building a de facto anti-West alliance. In a Russia-China
relations report compiled by the National Bureau of Asian Research, former Senior Director for
Asia on the National Security Council Evan S. Medeiros and senior scholar at RAND
Corporation Michael S. Chase identify China’s motivations as “spanning Chinese perceptions,
interests, and preferences about global security, economic, and diplomatic affairs.”93 Whether
Russia is on board because of China or because of other reasons does not make a huge
difference; the most recent 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy
name China and Russia as the largest threats to the United States, pointing out that the U.S.
should be prepared to preserve its values and the international system from being subverted by
Russia and China. There will be more discussion in the security section on how the U.S.
specifically view China, in collaboration with Russia, threatening America’s global security
paradigm.
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In terms of China’s relations with its neighbors as well as major blocs of the world, the
U.S. worries that China is shaping other countries’ behavior through its different types of power,
especially its economic power. Two examples will illustrate Washington’s concern. The first
case is the Philippines. Soon after assuming office, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte made a
diplomatic turn, pivoting away from America and getting closer to China. To solidify Duterte’s
rebalance to China, Beijing rewarded Manila extensively. During Duterte’s state visit to China in
October 2016, China granted the Philippines $9 billion USD in credit, including $6 billion USD
in soft loans.94 In addition, Xi and Duterte signed 13 bilateral cooperation documents, one of
which promised to build a $700 million USD steel plant in the Philippines.95 China’s economic
partnership with Duterte reassured him that his rebalance will not have negative economic
repercussion. A sustained China-Philippines friendship undermines America’s strategic interests
near a major point of contention, the South China Sea. The 2017 National Security Strategy
warns that China is trying to “pull the region into its orbit through state-led investments and
loans.”96 Another case is in a developed country, Greece. In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU
criticism on China’s human rights after a Chinese made a huge investment in Greece’s port of
Piraeus.97 Such a series of incidents corroborates the fear of western governments, especially that
of the American government, that China might be able to use its economic superiority to
penetrate western democracies and force them to give in to China’s influence. As written in the
2017 National Security Strategy, one of the priority action for America is to “help maintain the
sovereignty [of different countries] as China increases its influence in the region.”98
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III. Multilateral Diplomacy
1. The Objective Narration
China has been long interested in pursuing multilateral diplomacy. In the first ten years of
the 21st century, China mostly joined international institutions and participated in newly founded
regional institutions. China became an official World Trade Organization (WTO) member in
2001, and jointly started AESAN+3 and ASEAN+6. In the same year, China led the creation of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia, connecting countries in Central Asia. In
2006, the BRICs, an organization for emerging markets, was founded. Security-wise, China took
the initiative in holding and maintaining the Six-Party Talks.
Starting in the second ten years, China’s multilateral diplomacy began to enlarge its circle
of influence. In October and November 2013, the Chinese government raised the idea of building
“the Silk Road Economic Belt” (SREB) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (MSR),
aspiring to connect East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Europe.
Together known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) strategy or the “Belt and Road Initiative”
(BRI), the initiative shifted China’s focus westward. Although the U.S. tried to dissuade its
European and Asian partners and allies from joining the initiative, BRI was welcomed by
European powers such as Britain, France, and Germany as they see the prosperity of Eurasia as
the key to further their economic growth.99
Beijing’s initiative is well-equipped with funding sources. The creation of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) aimed at matching the function of the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank as a multilateral
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financing source.100 Despite U.S. opposition, many U.S. allies like Australia, South Korea,
Britain, and France joined the AIIB as founding members. China intends to perform massive
infrastructure building, including 80,000 kilometers of high-speed rail links, “major expansion of
road, oil and gas pipelines and digital cables, along with power production and energy grids.”101
The initial funding of the AIIB is supposed to surpass at least $100 billion. Further, the Chinese
government devoted enough money into other funds, with $40 billion for Silk Road Fund, $46
billion for the China-Pakistan economic corridor, and $10 billion for the BRICS-led New
Development Bank. The China Development Bank believes that the total spending for BRI
should reach $1 trillion.102
In addition to founding new institutions, Chinese leaders hosted and appeared in the most
important meetings and conferences around the world. In 2014, China hosted the 22nd APEC
Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Beijing. In 2016, China hosted the G20 summit in Hangzhou. In
2017, President Xi Jinping gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Later in the
same year, China hosted the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, discussing the
possibility of pushing forward ideas that could propel global development. All of this progress
has suggested that China has assumed an increasingly larger role in global governance.
Compared to the first ten years of 21st century, the second ten years have become more
economically focused.

2. The Chinese Perspective
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After more than four decades in the United Nations, two decades in the World Trade
Organization, and a decade participating in the leaders’ summits of G20, China believed that the
American-built global governance system are “the world’s only set of fairly mature multilateral
governance regimes that covers all sovereign states.”103 However, China has several concerns
over the system in which emerging markets are not proportionally represented, including the
U.S. commitment in maintaining and continuously investing in such a regime to reflect the new
interests. Simultaneously, China sees the concern from Washington where local politicians are
worried that China will give up Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” and become assertive
globally.104
In light of the concerns of both Chinese and Americans, China champions
“democratization in international relations based on national sovereignty.”105 Specifically, China
adopts a three-step approach to global governance reform.106 First, China believes that the
existing system is beneficial to most of the countries in the world. Thus, China only reforms
necessary parts that can make it fairer and more efficient. It does not aim for a revisionist
outcome. Second, the reform will be based on the common standing of all entities involved. And
thirdly, China will try to work closely with the United States to reform global institutions. As
Chinese President Xi Jinping said at UN Office in Geneva in January 2017, the world has been
deeply connected, and it should aim at building a community of common destiny.107
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3. The American Perspective
Washington fully understands Beijing’s desire to reform the structure of global
institutions. It poses a welcoming posture to this inclination because it understands that when the
U.S. and China work together, it is often much easier to reach an efficient outcome. However,
Washington is very careful about how China promotes its interests. It is afraid that China would
undermine U.S. interests in the process of reform. This worry has increased especially in the past
few years because China took a stronger stance in its participation in multilateral institutions and
global governance. Washington’s concern is exacerbated by two factors of this participation. On
the one hand, American experts on China believe that regional institutions such as the Asian
Development Bank cannot match the rising capability of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank.108 On the other hand, they believe that the picture that President Xi tries to show the global
community does not match the reality.109 On the economic front, China has become domestically
protectionist and continues to put restrictions on global movements of capital and ideas. On the
political front, China rejects the Hague ruling of the South China Sea dispute, discrediting the
Hague court as a credible rule-based multilateral institutions. In addition, China disappointed
Washington because China, as a permanent UN Security Council member, has vetoed and
threatened to veto resolutions that it deemed harmful to its interests.110 Growing pessimism in the
U.S. does not mean that American experts on China are discrediting China’s global governance
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efforts. After the U.S. pulled out from the Paris Climate Agreement, China’s leadership in global
climate and environment governance received a welcome from the United States. In this field,
Beijing earned Washington’s trust because Washington believes that Beijing’s global and
domestic environmental interests align almost perfectly.111 Thus, Beijing’s benign intention is
taken well by Washington.

IV. Security and Military
1. The Objective Narration
The security environment around China has been complicated. There are several major
issues at stake, including THAAD missile defense system in South Korea, the East and South
China Seas dispute and defense, Taiwan, and Doklam/Donglang standoff with regard to India.
Facing these security concerns, China has taken multiple steps in response. In November 2013,
China unexpectedly declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), which overlaps with
South Korea’s and Japan’s ADIZ. In late March 2014, the Chinese Coast Guard provoked
negative reactions in the Philippines by harassing and attempting to block a Filipino ship
bringing supplies and fresh troops to a Filipino Navy ship that had been grounded on the
disputed Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 and had been occupied by Filipino Marines ever since.
Islands reclamation and construction in the South China Sea have been continuing. Most
constructions could serve both civil and military uses, including airports and warehouses. Most
recently, however, China has set up jammers on some islands in the South China Sea for
exclusive military use.112 Similar construction has also happened near Sino-Indian border where
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recently built roads enable China to projectile its power more rapidly and closer to its border. For
THAAD and Taiwan issues, China has mixed security and economic responses. China has cut
trade in both goods and services with South Korea and Taiwan after each became provocative to
Beijing.113 Most recently, the Chinese battleships and airplanes conducted drills that encircled
the Taiwan islands.114
The complex geopolitical situations around China means that China needs to put a lot of
resources into building up its military and security paradigm. China’s military spending has
continued to grow over the past decades. In the last five years, average defense budget increase
has been around 10 percent. In recent years, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has launched
massive modernization programs. China’s military upgrade has been across different arms of
services. In the PLA Navy, the first aircraft carrier “Liaoning” was commissioned in 2012 and
was combat-ready in 2016. In addition, new supply ships, naval training ships, and a newgeneration destroyer were introduced in the past few years. In the PLA Air Force, J-20 stealth
fighter jets have started to build up operational capability. J-15 carrier-based fighter jets are also
in the process of training with “Liaoning.” J-31 stealth fighter jets are also being built. H-6K
bombers also conducted several long-range trips into the Pacific. In the PLA Rocket Force, the
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile posed a serious danger to the navy of foreign forces. Nuclear
modernization of China poses a greater deterrence to other nuclear powers.
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2. The Chinese Perspective
China’s national strategy is “to secure a peaceful environment for China’s development
and to maintain and promote world peace through its development.”115 To achieve its stated goal,
Beijing believes that military modernization and capacity building are necessary to protect its
national interests, including “[maintaining] national sovereignty, security, unification, and
territorial integrity; [addressing] military threats and emergencies; [safeguarding] the political
system and the leadership of the Communist Party of China stipulated in the Constitution;
[promoting] social stability and sustained economic development; and [contributing] to world
peace.”116
To serve China’s national strategy and core interests, China’s overall military and
security strategy includes “guideline of active defense, and the principles of defense, selfdefense, and retaliation as opposed to pre-emptive strikes,” which dictate its policies and actions
in the region.117 Facing the pressure of U.S. rebalance to Asia strategy, China tries to ensure its
sphere of influence and protect its core interests. On the issue of Taiwan, Donglang, and the
South China Sea, China is determined to protect its sovereignty. On the issue of the danger of
THAAD and nuclear threat of North Korea, the Chinese government has opted for a more vocal
than practical response.118 Both of them show that, despite its capacity building and
determination, China understands that any form of military competition with the U.S. is not in
the interest of China and prefers a stable Asia without military confrontation. China would prefer
not to put itself in an arms race.119 Overall, the Chinese government has demonstrated a
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generally tough attitude regarding its security interests though there are many practical
reservations.

3. The American Perspective
In the past half a decade, the American perception on Chinese security and military
policy has worsened significantly. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that
powerful military forces are emerging, highlighting China’s continuing military modernization.
The concern was “lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both
military capabilities and intentions.”120 Since 2015, the “China threat” argument has become
much stronger. The 2015 National Security Strategy has identified China’s involvement in the
East and South China Seas as a threat to American security interests. The “China threat”
argument has also been revealed in the 2015 National Military Strategy and the 2016 Defense
Posture Statement.121 Under the Trump Administration, the “China threat” argument looms even
larger. In the 2017 National Security Strategy, China is said to be the most significant security
challenge to the United States.122 In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, China is first mentioned
as a “strategic competitor” to the United States and a “revisionist power.”123 In addition, the U.S.
has viewed Chinese military and security buildups as coercive in nature by gaining “veto power
of other nations’ decision,” “displacing the U.S. in the [Asia-Pacific] region, “[replacing] U.S.
military hegemony” with its own.124
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Regarding specific Chinese military and security actions in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S.
deems them as signs of a fundamental disregard of U.S. interests in the region and a challenge to
U.S. global military hegemony. These actions take a variety of forms. 125 The creation of the East
China Sea ADIZ took the political form. Putting trade barriers against South Korea took the
economic form. Building roads in China-India-Bhutan border and seizing the Scarborough Shoal
took the physical form. Nonetheless, all these actions demonstrate an increasing amount of
assertiveness of the Chinese government and the PLA.126
A special report written by three U.S. military experts, namely David M. Finkelstein,
Phillip C. Saunders, and Randall G. Schriver, reveals some common perceptions in the U.S.
defense circles regarding China and its defense policy.127 These typical perceptions include 1)
that CCP believes that the U.S. is generally politically hostile towards the regime and hopes to
adopt a containment strategy, 2) that the PLA assessment has indirectly pointed out that the U.S.
has “dark motives” against the PLA, 3) that “China’s desire to counter U.S. capabilities… in the
vicinity of the PRC” drives the PLA modernization and military policy, 4) that, fortunately, both
the PLA and the U.S. military would love to reduce unnecessary confrontations when possible,
and 5) that both believe direct military conflicts are more likely to happen in the sea.

IV. Economic Engagement
1. The Objective Narration
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Since the opening up and reform, China gradually opened its door to the world by
reforming its domestic and foreign economic policy. Most noticeable change is the economic
reform. After the 18th National People’s Congress in 2013, the world has been waiting for more
economic reform as people have high expectation for President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang. For
the past five years, China has pushed for domestic reforms in both trade and financial sectors.
Most recently, at the 2018 Bo’ao Forum for Asia, President Xi announced several measures to
liberalize Chinese economy, including lowering tariffs on imported vehicles and protecting
intellectual property.128 At the same time, however, there is still state interventions. The Chinese
government has intervened in the rate of foreign exchange and controlled capital outflow.129
Both liberal policies and statist measures have been implemented during Xi’s era.
Despite how policies have developed, China’s economic engagement with the rest of the
world has always been increasing. In 2017, the total import and export value of China reached
$4.1 trillion USD.130 During Xi’s era, China’s trade volume (two ways combined) has been
around $4 trillion USD.131 China and the U.S have been the largest trading partner of each other.
By 2016, China-U.S. bilateral trade reached $519.6 billion USD, a 40-fold increase compared to
the start year of opening up and reform.132 Similarly, bilateral trade with the European Union,
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Russia, and major blocs of the world have also had a comparable increase. And China enjoyed a
trade surplus in most of these relationships.
In addition to bilateral progress, the Chinese government has also promoted several
multilateral mechanisms to globalize its economy, including both economic initiatives and
multilateral institutions. Briefly introduced in the multilateral diplomacy dimension, China
joined the WTO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 2001, starting to
participate in the global economic order and integrate into the world economy. As the Chinese
economy grew rapidly, China co-initiated the BRICs (later BRICS) in 2006, and then put
forward BRI and AIIB in 2013. In November 2017, the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, which comprises ASEAN countries, China and five other regional countries, had its
first Leaders’ Summit, which is a serious step towards its conclusion of negotiations.133 In these
efforts, China has gone through a transition from a participant of the global economy to a leader
in fewer than two decades.
China has also pushed for the internationalization of its currency, the Remminbi (RMB).
When China first tried to add its currency to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in 2010,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rejected its request.134 After President Xi came into
office, along with the Chinese government, he has launched a global campaign to reform the
international monetary system. In 2015, the IMF finally accepted the RMB into the SDR basket
and gave 10.92 percent of the weight to RMB.135 The reassignment made the Chinese RMB the
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third largest currency in SDR, smaller than the U.S. dollar and the euro but larger than the yen
and the British pound.

2. The Chinese Perspective
Peaceful development has been the central theme of Chinese foreign policy. To China, its
peaceful development is the key to China’s success in the past four decades. The Chinese
government has tried to strive for economic globalization so that it could achieve a win-win
situation. In many occasions, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of
globalization. In September 2015, Xi delivered a speech in Seattle, addressing the importance of
reinforcing win-win cooperation.136 During the 2016 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in
Hangzhou, he stressed the necessity to expedite the process of economic globalization.137 At the
2017 Davos World Economic Forum, Xi said, “in the face of both opportunities and challenges
of economic globalization, the right thing to do is to seize every opportunity, jointly meet
challenges and chart the right course for economic globalization.”138 Xi’s speeches meant that
China’s economic engagement with the rest of the world is of ultimate importance to China.
Having the determination in mind, the world now faces three critical issues according to
President Xi, including first, a lack of robust driving forces for global growth, second, inadequate
global economic governance, and third, uneven global development.139 Existing global
institutions and economic orders are not able to catch up with the changes in new industrial and
economic landscape. The Chinese economic actions are attempts to solve these problems.
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China’s domestic economic reform strives for “a dynamic, innovation-drive growth model” in
China; furthering bilateral trade creates a win-win situation; launching new economic initiatives
as well as institutions and pushing for internationalization of RMB create a more equitable and
inclusive global economic model.140 With economic links, the world would be bounded closer
and a community of common destiny would come to fruition.
China believes that its economic view will create a positive sum result that is better off
for all than the zero sum game played by the Trump Administration. China believed that the rise
of the emerging markets means that they received less representation of voices than what they
should have received. To experts in China, the U.S. should be fully aware that post-World War II
global economic order has favored itself the most, and it is time for China to correct it.141

3. The American Perspective
The U.S. believes that, after China’s opening up and reform, it has achieved a certain
level of economic reform and liberalization. America, China, and the rest of the world have
benefited from it. However, the speed and extent of the reform have not met Washington’s
expectations. SOEs continued to receive subsidies from the government; exchange rate of
currency has been intervened; capital flow is still controlled. Although China’s reform is still
undergoing and more liberal measures are said to unfold, many have called them “too little, too
late.”142 There is a stronger consensus in the U.S. that China should liberalize its economy more
and closely follow its commitment to the rules of the WTO and its bilateral trade agreements
140
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with the United States. Otherwise, the U.S. should employ necessary measures to ensure that
China follows those requirements, including shifting from a strategy of general cooperation to
conditional or constrained cooperation, mostly in trade, investment and high-tech sectors.143
In addition, as China became more technologically advanced, the U.S. and China have
become more substitutive than complementary. The U.S. has been accusing that China has not
been following the rules of the WTO and that China has been profiting from its violation.
According to the 2017 National Security Strategy, China has stolen the intellectual property of
the U.S. at a level of hundreds of billions dollars per year.144 As two prominent American
scholars, Scott Kennedy and Elizabeth Economy said, “what was once the ballast of the
relationship has increasingly becoming a source of growing tensions. The two economies appear
less complementary and increasingly competitive.”145 The increasing sense of competitiveness
and the growing sense of unfairness jointly produce a tougher stance on China.
On China’s multilateral cooperation and institutions, China believes that it has had
strategic gains from its unfair trade practices and investment with Europe.146 In a similar vein,
China has also dominated its trade relationships with emerging markets and developing
countries. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy called for providing alternatives of
economic partners to these countries by promoting American goods and services.147 Regarding
China’s request to join the SDR basket, the U.S. believes that the Chinese fiscal and monetary
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systems do not meet the standard to be included. Instead, it asks China to further its economic
liberalization and reform.148
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Chapter 4 – The Case of the South China Sea
The last two chapters have set up the background to conduct a joint theoretical and
empirical analysis of the Chinese and American perceptions on the Chinese foreign policy. In
this chapter and next, two cases in different spheres of Chinese foreign policy will be examined.
This chapter will focus on the case of the South China Sea. The next chapter will focus on the
Belt and Road Initiative.
The South China Sea was selected as the first case because tensions between the
American and Chinese perceptions involve multiple dimensions discussed in the last chapter.
The South China Sea is a strategically crucial sea line of communication, connecting countries
from the Middle East to Northeast Asia. Such a passage not only influences both China’s and
America’s relations with regional countries but also determines the security paradigm in the
region. The political wrestling between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea is a
microcosm of that in the Asia-Pacific. Further, the Hague ruling over the case of The Republic of
the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China reflects that the outcome of the South China
Sea disputes sheds light on the effectiveness of current multilateral institutions and the
development of future global governance. Existing international institutions are not able to
bridge the gap between American and Chinese perceptions.
With the strategic importance of the South China Sea in mind, this chapter will first
recount major steps China has taken since the South China Sea became contentious in the 2010s.
Then both Chinese and American perceptions on Chinese rhetoric and action will be introduced,
analyzed, and compared. I will single out reasons that led to different perceptions, examine
whether misperceptions exist, and figure out how different perceptions undermine Sino-U.S.
relations. Lastly, I will give my recommendations on what both countries can do to reduce
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misperceptions and bridge the gap between different perceptions, which, in turn, will strengthen
Sino-U.S. relations in a time of tension.

I. Unfolding China’s Actions in the South China Sea
Historically, the South China Sea has been at the center of Sino-U.S. relations, with both
direct and indirect conflict between the two countries. An example of direct tension was the
Hainan Island incident. In 2001, a Chinese J-8II interceptor fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3
intelligence aircraft in the South China Sea, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the
forced landing of the American aircraft in Hainan, China. Tensions escalated until a letter was
delivered from the U.S. ambassador in China to the Chinese foreign minister. The letter was
written ambiguously, with the intention that either side could interpret in its own favor. Tensions
gradually defused as the translation from English to Chinese gave enough leeway for both
countries retain their diplomatic dignity.
More often, indirect conflict takes the form of tensions between China and U.S. security
allies and partners in the region. Conflictual territorial claims over the South China Sea islands
among neighboring countries have existed for a long time. Rich natural resources in the ocean
and the waterway’s strategic importance have contributed to tensions among these nations, since
the South China Sea has proven reserve of seven billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, and a third of global shipping goes through it.149 Currently, six countries and
regions, including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei, hold
sovereignty claims over the islands. Among all the islands and reefs, the Spratly Islands (Chinese
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name Nansha), Paracel Islands (Xisha), Pratas Islands (Dongsha), Macclesfield Bank
(Zhongsha), and Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao) are most contentious.
Long-standing conflicts reemerged and have been exacerbated gradually since 2011,
when China believed an Indian vessel intruded into Chinese territory. In April 2012, the
Philippine Navy detained some Chinese fishermen who were harvesting in disputed waters. In
response, China took control and blocked the Scarborough Shoal’s lagoon and prevented
Philippine ships from resting. Three months later, China created a new city, Sansha, to govern
the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands.150
In January 2013, the Philippines brought up a compulsory arbitration against China under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the month after, China
returned the Philippines’ note verbale and expressed its non-acceptance and non-participation
stance regarding the case.151 In December 2014, China published its Position Paper on the South
China Sea arbitration. The Position Paper stated China’s position that the Arbitral Tribunal did
not have jurisdiction over the case brought by the Philippines because “the subject-matter is
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features,” which does not fall within the jurisdiction
of the UNCLOS declaration filed by China.152 On July 12, 2016, the court ruled unanimously in
favor of the Philippines. Two days later, the Chinese foreign ministry published another report
rejecting the ruling of the tribunal court.
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Despite China’s rejection of the Hague ruling, China has continued its endeavors to solve
maritime disputes through bilateral negotiations with other involved parties. In the initial
aftermath of the Hague ruling, China prevented ASEAN countries from collectively criticizing
China by selectively approaching some members of ASEAN to block the joint criticism. Two
weeks after the Hague ruling, Cambodia stepped forward in an ASEAN meeting to block a joint
statement criticizing China.153 Later, China’s rapprochement with the Philippines became evident
when, as the 2017 ASEAN, the Philippines avoided mentioning China’s reclamation and
construction activities in the South China Sea.154 In May 2017, China and ASEAN reached a
framework for a code of conduct (COC) for the disputed South China Sea. This code of conduct
is seen as a continuation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties (DOC) in the
South China Sea.155
During Beijing’s contact with Manila, two issues are especially important: island
reclamation and island construction. Through negotiations, China agreed to Philippine’s proposal
that neither side reclaims more islands.156 Nonetheless, new construction is not completely
solved. In August 2017, China protested to the Philippines for new construction on a sandbar in
the Spratly Islands. Three months later, Philippine President Duterte halted the construction.157
In comparison, China continued its construction on Fiery Cross Reef (Yongshu Jiao) and showed
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footage of its transformation on China Central Television, China’s state-controlled television
broadcaster.158 Despite the Philippines’ protest, the Chinese government claimed that the
construction was intended to improve disaster prevention capability for civil use.159
In addition to military buildups on maritime features, China has used its navy and air
force for shows of force in the South China Sea and nearby waters. China’s sole aircraft carrier
Liaoning has conducted several drills in the South China Sea and sailed into the Western Pacific.
The H-6K heavy bombers have taken similar trips and patrolled near disputed islands. In
response to China’s actions, and to ensure American interests, the U.S. Navy started the first
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in October 2015.160 In 2016 and 2017, the U.S.
conducted three and four U.S. FONOPs, respectively.161 Again, in January 2018, U.S. Destroyer
USS Hopper conducted a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal.162 This is the
fifth FONOP since the Hague ruling rejected China’s territorial claim over the man-made
islands. In response, China has taken both diplomatic and security measures. Spokespersons of
China’s foreign ministry have repeatedly accused the U.S. of illegal entrance into Chinese waters
and of threatening regional stability.163 In addition, Chinese vessels shadowed the U.S. ships
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when they conducted FONOPs.164 Overall, the PLA Navy and Air Force have increased their
presence in the South China Sea.

II. Chinese and American Perceptions
Chinese Perception
The Chinese government believes that it has sovereignty rights, since ancient times, over
the islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea within the Nine-Dash Line. The Chinese
people claim to be the first to “discover, name, explore and exploit the resources” of the South
China Sea.165 China thus argues it has legitimate reasons to build both civilian and military
facilities on these maritime features, and send coast guard, air force, and navy personnel to patrol
the water. For those maritime features claimed by China but not under Chinese control, China
proposes that bilateral negotiations should be the means to solve the problem.166 Beijing believes
that non-regional parties should not be involved in regional issues as they may complicate the
situation. Upholding a rule-based order in the South China Sea while hoping to address the issue
bilaterally, China hopes that the U.S. would support the negotiation of COC.
In keeping with this, China believes that its non-acceptance and non-participation attitude
towards the compulsory arbitration brought up by the Philippines is legitimate. Two reasons
stand out, other than China’s preference for bilateral negotiations. On the one hand, China
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believes that the temporary Hague court under UNCLOS has no jurisdiction over the case
because, in 2006, China turned in a statement opting out of compulsory arbitration in accordance
with UNCLOS.167 On the other hand, China sees UNCLOS as inapplicable to the behaviors
about which the Philippines has concerns, since UNCLOS only has jurisdiction over limited
issues, such as the exclusive economic zone, freedom of navigation, and environmental
protection. China argues that the issues brought up by the Philippines involve delimitation that
falls outside of the UNCLOS jurisdiction.168 Thus, China rejects the Hague ruling as null and
void.
The Chinese government hopes that the U.S. will honor its commitment not to take sides
in territorial disputes. However, it feels that the U.S. presence near the South China Sea, such as
the visit of the USS Carl Vinson to Vietnam and the troops stationed in the Philippines, supports
the territorial claims of American allies and friends in the region by a show of force, and “drags
China into a geopolitical competition.”169 In regard to America’s FONOPs and other missions in
the nearby waters, China deems U.S. actions a disturbance of regional peace and stability.170 The
Chinese government believes that the U.S. should help create a peaceful and congenial
environment for China and other regional parties to solve their conflicts bilaterally, instead of
raising tensions in the region by conducting provocative exercises, proposing joint patrolling
with neighboring countries, or sailing within 12 nautical miles of China’s maritime holdings.
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Although Chinese scholars believe that both Washington and Beijing share a common interest in
sea lane safety and freedom of navigation, they do not think that the current US actions are deescalating. Many prominent Chinese scholars warn of the possibility of “a shared worst
outcome,” a direct military confrontation.171 A military engagement is not beneficial to either
side. The U.S. should seek ways to reform the international order in order to include and
collaborate with China in a time of rapid change.172
In its 2017 Defense White Paper, China cited, “misunderstandings and lack of mutual
trust” as impediments to regional countries working collaboratively.173 Although traditional
security concerns are hard to make a significant breakthrough, China identified several fields in
non-traditional maritime security threats in which both should collaborate, including
environmental disaster, piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking, should be dealt with jointly by
regional forces.

American Perception
Fundamental U.S. interests in the South China Sea are “the free flow of commerce, the
maintenance of a rules-based order government by international laws and norms, and the ability
of countries in the region to make their own strategic choices.”174 As a maritime power with
several territories in the Pacific, the United States sees itself inseparable from any issues in the
Asia-Pacific. This, without any doubt, includes America’s participation in the issues regarding
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the South China Sea. A secure, stable, and open order is in America’s interests.175 American
scholars often express their concern that, by claiming that Asian security should be decided by
Asians, China tries to push the U.S. out of the South China Sea, which threatens U.S. interests in
the region.176
Regarding Chinese responses to the Philippines’ behavior prior to the onset of the South
China Sea case, Thomas Christensen, a Princeton professor and former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs saw China’s actions as opportunistic, to the
extent that it seems that “Beijing is waiting for provocations by others to legitimize Chinese
actions that will consolidate control over the islands that China has claimed for decades but not
administered in the past.”177 With regard to the Hague ruling under UNCLOS, although the U.S.
is not a formal signatory, it treats UNCLOS an international law that binds signatories. As thenAssistant Secretary John Kirby said, “the United States expresses its hope and expectation that
both parties will comply with their obligations.”178 With China’s defiance over the Hague ruling,
the U.S. believes that China is challenging the rules-based maritime order. Since 2015, U.S.
Navy has conducted about a dozen FONOPs, signaling America’s heightened alert to the
openness and stability of the region.
Disagreement on international law has worried the U.S. because not only the U.S.
believes that China’s violation undermines the regional order, but also because current
international laws, most importantly UNCLOS, cannot provide a guidance of action to which
both countries agree. The U.S. worries about the recent construction on the Chinese-controlled
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maritime features, as well as the PLA’s patrols in the waters, some of which have tailgated U.S.
FONOPs battleships. Washington views these actions destabilizing. Vice Admiral Phillip Sawyer
of the U.S. Seventh Fleet said in early 2018 that the U.S. defense circles are concerned because
they do not know what China is doing in the bases on those islands and reefs.179 Yet, Washington
sees these actions inherently dangerous because it could undermine the freedom of navigation
and the safety of sea lines of communication in the South China Sea.180
In addition to growing direct military competition in the region, the U.S. is also
concerned about China’s relations with other regional parties and about its major security allies’
and friends’ strength in the region. Washington worries that, while its interests are challenged by
China, regional countries are not able to decide their fates on their own. This is reflected by
Washington’s determination to improve its security ties, most notably with the Philippines and
Vietnam. In 2014, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement that allows U.S. troops to return to the country.181 Prior to the accession of current
Philippines President Duterte, the Philippines was the main intermediator through which the U.S.
was involved in regional issues. After Duterte bandwagoned with China, however, Vietnam
became the U.S.’s new regional partner. In early 2018, the USS Carl Vinson became the first
American aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War.182 These actions signal to
Beijing that Washington has growing concerns along several dimensions in the South China Sea.

179

Steven Stashwick, "China Dismissive of US Carrier Visit to Vietnam," The Diplomat, March 14, 2018, accessed
March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-dismissive-of-us-carrier-visit-to-vietnam/.
180
Green, Bush, and Rapp-Hooper, "Asia-Pacific Security Issues in the U.S.-China Relationship," 24-37.
181
Ankit Panda, "US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Bolsters 'Pivot to Asia'," The
Diplomat, April 29, 2014, accessed March 1, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/us-philippines-enhanceddefense-cooperation-agreement-bolsters-pivot-to-asia.
182
Steven Stashwick, "China Dismissive of US Carrier Visit to Vietnam," The Diplomat, March 14, 2018, accessed
March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/china-dismissive-of-us-carrier-visit-to-vietnam/.

71

III. The Assessment of Perceptions and Misperceptions
Using the theoretical model that we developed in Chapter 2, we will look into whether
Chinese perceptions and U.S. perceptions reflect a clear assessment of China’s actions in the
South China Sea. We find that the variables that govern either perception are different. Most
notably, the history variable matters to China significantly while anything but history variable
matters to the U.S. perception. We will also examine whether these perceptions might fall into
different categories of misperceptions.
The history, power, and change of rules or norms variables dictate Chinese perceptions
over its actions in the South China Sea. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China,
Beijing’s maritime experience vis-a-vis the U.S. has not been a pleasant one. The U.S. seventh
fleet once barricaded Beijing from crossing the Taiwan Strait and reunifying both sides of the
strait. The Hainan Island incident refreshed Beijing’s memory that Chinese naval and air forces
have always been disadvantaged relative to the U.S. navy and air force. With such an impression,
Beijing has been insecure about facing the security challenges in the South China Sea. Building
up its strength with maritime features, and dispatching regular air force, naval, and coast guard
patrols, serve two ends for Beijing. First, these actions showcase China’s improved military
capability. Second, they underscore Beijing’s intention to safeguard sovereignty over the
disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea. China also perceives its rejection of the Hague
ruling as legitimate, because it believes that its right of non-participation of compulsory
arbitration over sovereignty issues was granted after it submitted its declaration to the United
Nations. This action is consistent with the legitimate use of international laws to protect its own
interests. Thus, it does not believe its rejection of the Hague ruling should be deemed a violation
or a threat to a rules-based order.
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American perceptions are mostly shaped by considerations of power, identity, change of
norms, and information. The U.S. has witnessed a stronger Chinese presence in the South China
Sea. Freedom of navigation was never an issue prior to China’s military modernization. As the
Chinese navy and air force become more capable, Washington has become concerned about its
reduced military advantage. This is especially worrisome for military leaders and security
analysts, as they deem capability more important than intention. However, even for diplomats
who care more about intentions, China’s statements, like “Asians decides Asian affairs,” send a
message that U.S. interests in the South China Sea are not primary. Further, China’s nonparticipation and non-acceptance of the Hague ruling and heighten America’s perception of
threat, as this is a violation of existing norms and rules. China’s rejection of the international
ruling, despite China’s belief that the Hague was incorrect, sends a signal to the U.S. that there
would not be a lower bond that by which China will abide. In light of this, the U.S. is more likely
to base its perception of the threat China poses on China’s capability than its intentions. Last but
not least, lack of transparency in recent construction on Chinese maritime features exacerbates
tensions between the two countries: that new construction apparently could serve military
purposes changes the U.S. perception.
Comparing Chinese and American perceptions, it seems that, while China deems its
power not strong enough to safeguard its sovereignty claims, the U.S. sees China as powerful
enough to undermine international—and American—freedom of navigation and the sea lines of
communication. As security seekers, both the U.S. and China are vulnerable to the security
dilemma. China’s actions are defensive in Beijing’s perspective. However, a different
understanding of sovereignty the rights it generates gives rise to the security dilemma. The U.S.
may find China’s patrols, especially those that tailgated U.S. battleships, disturbing. However,
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we have to understand that a fundamental difference between China and the U.S. is that “[China]
is a land power developing its naval capabilities, [whereas America is] a maritime power coming
onshore.”183 The countries are seeing the same actions through different lenses. The current
international law and institutions fail to resolve the security dilemma as both of them have
incompatible views of UNCLOS and the Hague court. The current non-binding rules, thus, are
unable to either restrain China’s action in the water or provide legal support for China’s action
that convinces America.
In addition to security dilemma, another potential heuristic filter of misperception is the
influence of fears. China’s capacity has increased significantly, though various American reports
have exaggerated China’s increasing military capacity. The PLA’s rapid modernization generates
fears in Washington’s inner circles, as the U.S. is afraid of losing global hegemony and being
challenged regionally. Such fears also lead to overestimating one’s importance. A commonly
held view in American defense circles is that many Chinese military actions in the South China
Sea are targeted at the U.S., though China never explicitly stated in that way.184 The reality is
that China would strengthen its control over its claimed territory no matter who was involved in
these disputed issues; its actions are not a response to the United States.

IV. Policy Recommendation
Based on the perceptions and misperceptions discussed earlier, several recommendations
for either the U.S., China, or both are proposed here to ensure a stable South China Sea in the
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near future. These policy recommendations are proposed as examples of how to reduce threat
perception. Bear in mind that some of them may not be easily implemented.
1. Don’t let defense leaders and security analysts dictate the South China Sea issues and
solutions. Security experts generally focus more on capability than intention. As China’s
military capability increases, defense circles in America are generally likely to worry.
Diplomats and politicians should lead the discussions on finding common ground and
solutions to reduce South China Sea tensions. This is not a call to neglect security
interests; a consistent perspective within either side is important.
2. The bilateral military and security dialogue should be improved both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Lack of transparency often leads to a perceived threat, as has been true for,
the United States in this case. Both countries should continue the U.S.-China Diplomatic
and Security Dialogue, and expand communications of military officials.
3. Both the U.S. and China should start to negotiate a code of conduct either formally or
tacitly. As China increases its maritime missions, the two countries’ navies will face each
other more often. An agreed code of conduct will reduce the possibility of
miscommunication that may lead to an escalation of tensions at the tactical level. This
code must be more binding than the DOC or existing international laws. Both the U.S.
and China should practice its use often once it is agreed upon. Such a code of conduct
will also help to lower the risks brought by disagreements on interpretations of
international law.
4. Beijing should stop using ambiguous language that may reinforce Washington’s
misperceptions. Language that may infringe U.S. interests should be avoided so long as
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Chinese interests are not hurt. Legitimate U.S. interests should be recognized by China at
appropriate times.
5. China should continue to carry out direct bilateral negotiations with ASEAN and regional
countries to formulate a COC that does not seriously challenge the interests of the U.S.
During the negotiations, China should not put the U.S. in a situation where the U.S. has
to either uphold its allies’ and friends’ interests while contradicting China’s interests or
violate its security commitment. China should avoid posing such a hard binary choice for
the U.S. The U.S., in turn, should encourage direct bilateral dialogue among involved
parties and encourage a congenial environment for carrying out the conversation.
6. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate in non-traditional maritime challenges such as
anti-piracy, environmental degradation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions.
These activities will help both navies to formulate shared identity in regional governance
and reduce hostility.

As the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communiqué said in 1972, “Neither the U.S. nor China
should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other
country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”185 Both the U.S. and China have
realized that a stable South China Sea is vital for their interests. Each should give the other more
space to maneuver and work on step-by-step measures to reduce risks of conflict. If the tension
in the South China Sea can be reduced gradually, this will be a helpful precedent for resolving
conflictual interests in broader issues and in other dimensions as well.
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Chapter 5 – The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative
The last chapter is devoted to a security case. This chapter will analyze a development
case, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is China’s flagship policy since President Xi
came into office. BRI is a useful case for several reasons. First, the size of BRI as a single and
coherent foreign policy and initiative is unprecedented in Chinese history. Second, BRI is not
only a development proposal, but its successful implementation also involves security and
multilateral organizations dimensions. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), the major financing source for BRI, poses a challenge to the existing web of global
development institutions. Security components that ensure Chinese investment and constructions
abroad, including China’s military base in Djibouti, have also received wide global attention.
Last but not least, BRI embodies the so-called Chinese philosophy for global governance and
development. It is important to look into whether China’s philosophy accurately describes
Chinese actions, and whether America’s concerns about China’s philosophy are legitimate.
This chapter begins with a roadmap of the development of BRI. Next, both Chinese and
American perceptions will be outlined, followed by an analysis of major variables and heuristic
factors that explain the consolidation of both perceptions and their differences. In the end, some
aspirational policy recommendations are given based on the analysis of perception and
misperception.

I. Unfolding China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Originally named the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, BRI—comprised of “the Silk
Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”—was put forward by Chinese
President Xi Jinping in Astana, Kazakhstan, and Jakarta, Indonesia, in September and October
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2013. BRI proposed five links that integrate the Eurasian landmass. They include policy
coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-topeople communication.186 These links reflect Beijing’s vision that combines both soft
connections like policy cooperation and hard connections including transcontinental networks.
These connections are divided mainly into six economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia
Economic Corridor, New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China-Central Asia-West
Asia Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor.187 Soon after its
announcement, BRI has reached the center of the Chinese government’s work plan. According to
a comprehensive study done by Nadège Rolland, a scholar at National Bureau of Asian
Research,
[In a few months after the announcement of BRI, China] had rallied international support
and begun to secure significant financial resources, created a central supervisory group,
published a roadmap, mobilized the very best Chinese experts and intellectuals,
embarked on an aggressive soft-power business representatives to sign hundreds of
agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOU) promising more trade opportunities
and Chinese investment in neighboring countries.188
China has mobilized a huge amount of political, financial, technical, and human resources at
different administrative levels to get BRI started.
A month after Xi’s speeches in Jakarta, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China acknowledged its importance to the whole
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nation.189 In February 2015, a central leading small group was created to advance the
development of the Belt and Road.190 In the month following, BRI appeared in the 2015 State
Council’s report presented to the National People’s Congress during the “two sessions.”191 In the
report, BRI is said to be a top priority in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). On March 28,
2015, a document named “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Visions and Actions)” was published.192 Beijing assigned
different policy objectives to different industries and sectors of the society, making BRI more
than a development initiative. During the 19th Party Congress in late 2017, BRI was enshrined
into the constitution of the Communist Party of China, along with the superior leadership of Xi
Jinping.193
Most prominently, several financing institutions have been erected to support the flagship
initiative. Officially launched in June 2015, AIIB gathered 57 founding countries, among which
18 are European nations.194 Despite U.S. warnings, major European countries including Britain,
France, Germany, and Italy became signatories at AIIB’s opening ceremony.195 In March 2017,
another 13 countries and regions joined AIIB. As of March 2018, AIIB has 42 regional members,
22 non-regional members, and 20 perspective members located in all continents.196 China
committed $100 billion and took 26 percent of voting power, enough to veto major decisions at
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AIIB but not sufficient to block specific lending decisions.197 Besides AIIB, China also secured
$100 billion from the New Development Bank created by and for the BRICS countries. Apart
from multilateral financing, China has also mobilized its domestic resources to support its
flagship initiative. Drawing from its foreign reserve and its policy banks, China created the Silk
Road Fund that will allegedly provide $40 billion to profitable mid- and long-term projects.198
China’s policy banks—the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank—will
also invest in major projects abroad based on the necessity of development goals. According to a
study by the American Enterprise Institute, China has reached more than $138 billion USD in
foreign investment, $208 billion USD in construction projects overseas since 2014.199
To China, efforts in multilateral diplomacy and security dimensions safeguard BRI’s
success. The Chinese government has launched a global campaign for BRI. Each year since
2014, one of BRI participants would host the annual international Silk Road Forum. Istanbul,
Madrid, and Warsaw are the host countries for the years 2014 to 2016, respectively.200 In May
2017, an upgraded Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, attended by 29 heads of
state or government, representatives of more than 70 international organizations, and delegates
from more than 130 nations, was hosted in Beijing.201 In addition, other international events such
as Media Cooperation Forum on Belt and Road and the Silk Road International Film Festival
have become channels through which BRI is promoted.202
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Security-wise, China has built up its naval base at Djibouti near the Djibouti City, and
officially opened it on August 1, 2017. Located near the Gulf of Aden where the busiest
maritime routes cross, the Djibouti base is said to be able to provide logistic support for the PLA
Navy.203 Although this is the first Chinese naval base abroad, the PLA Navy has involved in
escort missions in the Gulf of Aden for more than a decade. A strengthened PLA Navy presence
in the Indian Ocean would protect Chinese investment and constructions along the 21st Maritime
Silk Road.

II. Chinese and American Perceptions Compared
Chinese Perception
According to the “Visions and Actions,” the Belt and Road Initiative is inherently
beneficial towards all countries involved.204 The Chinese government highlights BRI’s potential
as a win-win cooperation. Infrastructure is fundamental towards the development of a region. For
countries being landlocked in the center of Eurasia, BRI’s infrastructure building helps connect
Asian, European, and African countries. With transportation, telecommunication, and energy
integration, BRI will unleash the market potential of its participants. Natural resources from
Central Asian countries will have a larger market once they are able to be transported to major
sea lines of communication. As President Xi Jinping said at the World Economic Forum at
Davos in 2017, “Chinese companies have made over 50 billion US dollars of investment and
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launched a number of major projects in the countries along the routes, spurring the economic
development of these countries and creating many local jobs.”205
In addition, the Chinese government believes that the connectivity among BRI countries
will “align and coordinate [their] development strategies.”206 For example, the existence of
Eurasian Economic Union reflects that Russia has its development vision of Central Asian,
Caucasian, and East European countries. With diplomatic efforts, the Chinese government was
able to reach a “joint statement on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union” with Russia. The 2017 Belt and Road Forum
served a similar purpose. According to China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, the Forum
is a good chance to “pool more consensus,” “identify cooperation directions,” and “improve [a]
supporting system [that is capable of effectively coordinating among BRI nations].”207 Beijing
does not wish to promote BRI by sacrificing the interests of other countries and other policies.
Instead, Beijing sees BRI being capable of aligning the interests of different countries.
That being said, Chinese officials do not believe that China is exerting its influence
globally either by monopolizing the benefits or by exporting its political and economic model.
Yang Jiechi, CCP’s Politburo member and China’s State Councilor, openly stated that “China
does not intend to monopolize all the benefits or even take the lion's share, but will work with
partner countries to make the pie bigger and divide it equitably.”208 To Beijing, a better way to
characterize the relationship is that Beijing is trying to build a community of common destiny
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where the fate of all countries involved is associated with the success of BRI. As Shi Zhiqin, a
Resident Scholar at Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, said, “the central principles [of]
collaboration, building, and result-sharing… [demonstrate that] China is a responsible global
player in the international society.”209
Taking a step forward, Beijing believes that BRI and its financing agencies are
supplementary to the existing global order, and can co-exist with current institutions. On the one
hand, China labels BRI as a proponent of globalization and free trade. According to the “Visions
and Actions,” BRI “is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world
economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation.”210 On the other hand, the Chinese
government views BRI and AIIB as a proper adjustment to inefficiencies in the existing
institutions. From Chapter 3 we learned that the Chinese government considers the post-World
War II institutions most comprehensive. Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not satisfied
with the weight of representation for emerging markets in traditional institutions. At an informal
meeting among BRICS leaders during the 2016 Hangzhou G20 Summit, President Xi believes
that emerging markets should “actively promote reform in the governance structure of the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and increase the representation and voice of
emerging markets and developing countries.”211

American Perception
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The Chinese perception of BRI highlights the mutually beneficial nature of BRI.
However, American experts generally hold a more pessimistic view towards the economic profit
BRI could bring to other nations. In a most recent report published in March 2018, Derek
Scissors and Cecilia Joy-Perez, two Chinese economy experts at the American Enterprise
Institute, are two among many who share such a concern. They worry whether China’s partners
will benefit much from BRI projects, and whether China is able to carry out the Initiative in the
long run. According to their estimation, “BRI is better understood as construction projects worth
hundreds of billions of dollars taken on by state-owned enterprises (SOEs).”212 They believe that
most BRI projects are construction projects rather than investment, in which Chinese money is
used to hire Chinese contractors. They worry that these projects may not create as many jobs for
local people as promised by the Chinese government. In addition, most money came out from
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The debt of the Chinese government and SOEs
combined has accumulated to about 150% of Chinese GDP, which is not a stable level of
government debt.213 Nonetheless, other scholars, including Melanie Hart, Elizabeth C. Economy,
and Paul Gewirtz, believe that BRI has the potential to change the Eurasian landmass, and that
the U.S. should collaborate with China when possible.214 The U.S. would marginalize itself
economically if it chooses to totally disregard BRI. Otherwise, the U.S. may lose in the process
of the change of the economic balance of power internationally, and undermine the leading
position of the U.S. in the world economy.
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Toward whether BRI is able to achieve its stated goals, American attitudes are more
varied, with some believing that it could be beneficial to the region while other saying that it
stems from selfish ends. Despite different predictions of future outcomes, the American
perception believes that China has largely downplayed the strategic and security gains China
could harvest from BRI. Different analyses from the military, major think tanks, and the
government hold a consensus view that, through BRI, China is able to stabilize its western
provinces that are threatened by separatist powers, secure energy supply routes from Central
Asian countries and Russia, establish a larger military presence abroad than before, cultivate a
stronger than ever political influence to its partners, and pivot away from the pressure exerted by
America’s rebalance to Asia.215 In fact, America’s concerns over China’s strategic and security
gains in the region reflect a fundamental assumption that these gains undermine American
hegemony and its relative advantage over China. As Ely Ratner, a China scholar at Council on
Foreign Relations, argues, a stronger PLA presence in the region will weaken the determination
of third parties in the region to cooperate with the U.S. on security matters.216 American allies
and partners would possibly choose to abandon the U.S. and bandwagon with China for fear that
the U.S. may not honor its security commitment.
Besides a direct competition, Washington also showed its concern over the future of
international institutions and norms. The Obama Administration overtly expressed its concern
that BRI and AIIB may not meet environmental, labor and governance standards of existing
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Western-established institutions.217 Deeply inside, Obama’s worry indicated that, as a new
institution, AIIB increases China’s leadership status in the global institution system. China’s
power in international institutions grows despite whether AIIB challenges or supplements the
existing system.218 AIIB could gain power either by threatening to set up an alternative to the
current system or by tightly connecting AIIB with the World Bank or the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). With the potential decline in institutional power, the U.S. is worried that the
application of rules and norms would also change in favor of China and against the interests of
the United States. In the long run, it could challenge America’s hegemonic power in the field of
global institutions and order.

III. The Assessment of Perceptions and Misperceptions
The Chinese perception of the Belt and Road Initiative is largely benign and beneficial to
its participants. From the Chinese perspective, BRI should not be deemed threatening to other
countries mainly for two reasons based on our theoretical framework. First, BRI speaks to the
identity variable that tries to align the interests of China and other countries. According to
Rousseau’s study, when countries are able to create a shared identity by having more similarity,
they should find other countries less likely to have any intention to inflict harms on each other.
The Chinese perception is largely founded on the concept of reciprocity and mutual benefits. By
aligning Chinese interests with the interests of other participants, and tying all participants into
the same boat of BRI, participants should not find reasons that China will set them up, and threat
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perception should be minimal. Second, China believes that BRI and its funding sources are not a
change in rules or norms, and that they are able to coexist with current institutions including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or the Asian Development Bank.
The American perception is mostly grounded in power and information variables.
Although BRI and AIIB are not mature and large enough to compare with the combination of
Western-led institutions, their successful initiation, as well as the participation of more than 80
countries, demonstrates China’s leadership. Washington has witnessed the rise of Chinese
leadership as a form of political power. Although this does not reveal whether American
leadership subsides, the relative increase of Chinese power and the narrowing gap between
American and Chinese power makes Washington nervous. The U.S. is no longer the only postCold War country that is able to set up ultra-regional institutions. In addition, the information
variable, or the lack of it, increases the threat perception of the United States. Despite China’s
original intention—whether it aims merely for reciprocal economic gains, or whether it strives
for the security and strategic gains—the U.S. is likely to consider China’s taciturnity as a sign of
hiding its true intention. Even if the Chinese government has a benign purpose initially, it could
be misinterpreted, and thus, thwarted by the United States.
Given the analysis of American and Chinese perceptions, there could be several sources
of misperception. For China, misperception may come from the fact that it fails to attract the
U.S. through identity similarity. Although China’s strategy of tying everyone in the same boat
might be successful for participants, the U.S. is not officially a part of BRI or AIIB. The U.S. is
not an in-group country with regard to China’s position in BRI. Instead, it is an out-group
country that is opposite to the position of China. China could have downplayed U.S. threat
perception in the identity variable.

87

Another source of misperception comes from the lack of spheres of measure. We have
seen that many American experts are not as optimistic about the economic success of BRI as
their Chinese counterparts. “All BRI-related documents lack exact figures and detailed
timeframes.”219 Cognitive dissonance comes into play when there lack specific criteria and
measures that both China and the U.S. agree on. The existing competitive mentality between the
U.S. and China, which is the source for dissonance, would make the U.S. interpret Chinese
actions negatively when their interpretation could go either way.
Last but not least, it is possible that the creation of BRI is due to careful consideration of
the Chinese government to solve its development issues. Instead, the U.S. may overestimate its
importance in pushing China westward. The rebalance to Asia policy may render China more
determined in implementing BRI, but China’s Western Development strategy, along with the
discussion of expanding it into the center of Eurasia, has long been part of the discussion of the
Chinese government.

IV. Policy Recommendation
Based on the difference in American and Chinese perceptions and their assessments,
several policy recommendations are listed below. Similar to the caveat in the last chapter, these
policy recommendations aim to lower threat perception. They may face different levels of
practical constraints when being implemented.
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1. Previously China has welcomed the U.S. to participate in BRI and AIIB.220 China should
continue its efforts to invite the U.S. to join AIIB. In the short term, the likelihood for the
U.S. to join is low. China should try to include the U.S. in subtler ways, such as involving
the U.S. in some BRI projects, or establishing connection and coordination through future
conferences like the Belt and Road Forum, which will reduce America’s concerns over
China’s capacity in upholding environmental and labor standards. China should have
incentives to ensure a congenial attitude of the U.S. towards its development strategy by
trying to align the interests of both.
2. The Trump Administration has shown both interest and contempt in collaborating with
China on regional development.221 It is not very likely for the U.S. to replicate a similar
initiative for Eurasia. If the U.S. government wants to put a check on the Chinese
Initiative, it is easier to achieve it through having international organizations to supervise
Chinese activities. The U.S. should encourage communication and collaboration between
existing western-led institutions and Chinese-led AIIB. Existing institutions provide a
more legitimate channel through which American interests are better preserved.
3. China should actively seek collaboration between AIIB and the World Bank, the IMF, or
the ADB. This will also help to address America’s concern that AIIB and BRI may not
meet the standards of existing institutions. By truly integrating AIIB into existing global
financing institutions, there will be less of a chance to change global rules or norms,
which would partially lower Washington’s threat perception.
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4. Both sides should jointly develop a specific set of criteria measuring the contribution of
BRI. The U.S. should avoid languages that fully negate BRI’s contribution. Washington
should judge BRI based on Chinese actions and their results, instead of criticizing it at the
forefront. The U.S. should understand that such a huge initiative will certainly have
geopolitical impacts. Yet, if economic development never occurs, strategic and security
gains would never materialize.
5. There will be an increasing amount of interactions between the U.S. Navy and the PLA
Navy near the Gulf of Aden. Both navies should seek opportunities in operational and
training cooperation under the permit of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act of
the United States.

Unlike the security realm, development strategy is much easier to build a positive sum
game where both the U.S. and China could achieve a win-win scenario. What is at the center of
current contention is how the U.S. and China should share the benefits of a globalized world
economy. Both countries should avoid giving each other incorrect and unnecessary signals that
distort the perception of each other. Instead, both countries should try to build confidence
through existing institutions and other mechanisms that can align the interests of both.
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Chapter 6 – A Solution to U.S.-China Conundrum
After examining the two case studies of the Belt and Road Initiative and the South China
Sea, we have seen different variables that dictate American and Chinese perceptions of Chinese
foreign policy. Zooming out from specific cases, I will combine the theoretical framework from
Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence from Chapter 3, and conduct a holistic analysis of the
American and Chinese perceptions of the Chinese foreign policy across dimensions. In this
concluding chapter, first, I will explain what variables have influenced the Chinese and
American perceptions and how. Then, I will compare the differences between both perceptions
and give out aspirational policy recommendations that could lower threat perceptions and
potentially contribute to more congenial U.S.-China relations.

I. The Assessment of the Chinese Perception
The Chinese perception of its foreign policy is dictated by power, identity, change of
rules or norms, and history. Information certainly does not influence China’s perception of its
own foreign policy as they are fully aware of all information that led to its foreign policy.
Among the four variables that matter, history is the most one. Traditionally, the Chinese
perception of its foreign policy is deemed as a proper response to its historical experience. In the
Chinese background section in Chapter 3, we have seen that China has often used the victimhood
narrative. Thus, the history variable has a huge impact on the Chinese perception of the Chinese
foreign policy across dimensions. The Chinese perceive that the historical experience has put
China in an unfavorable position in its foreign relations. The Chinese foreign policy should aim
to address such an unbalanced situation. Consistent with our findings in the case of the South
China Sea, we have seen that China has mobilized its historical narration in defending its
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territorial claims and building up capacity to protect its claims facing different security
challenges. During the Donglang/Doklam standoff near the Sino-Indian-Bhutanese border,
Beijing has repeatedly claimed that Donglang/Doklam, along with many other contentious
territories in the region like South Tibet (more commonly known as Arunachal Pradesh), is part
of China. Beijing deems its road construction appropriate under its sovereignty claims. In
addition to the security dimension, the multilateral diplomacy dimension is also heavily
influenced by the history variable. As the Chinese economy grows, Beijing believes that existing
global institutions underappreciate the contribution of the Chinese economy and fail to reflect the
interests of emerging markets. History, thus, not only shapes how the Chinese government thinks
of its foreign policy, but also serves as a comparison between past and present.
Besides the history variable, both the power and the identity variables are also important
for China. Furthermore, there is a pattern that the power variable is more important for China
when analyzing Sino-U.S. relations, while the identity variable is more important for China’s
relations with less powerful countries. Although China acknowledges that its power has been
increasing, China still deems itself much less powerful than the United States. China believes
that its military actions are defensive in nature and its institution-building activities are not able
to replace existing global institutions. Therefore, threat level of its foreign policy should not be
very high, especially to the United States. At the same time, the Chinese perception also
mobilized the identity variable in China’s relations with other countries. I use the word
“mobilize” to characterize its perception because China deliberately highlights the similarities
between China and other nations while hiding their power gaps. In most of the other bilateral
relations, China has called for equality among major countries, between developed and
developing nations, and between big countries and small countries. Nonetheless, objectively
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speaking, for most Chinese bilateral relations other than Sino-U.S. relations, power asymmetry
exists and is largely in favor of China. In this case, the Chinese perception deliberately
overemphasizes the identity variable and understates the power variable. In sum, in terms of
Sino-U.S. relations, the Chinese perception gives more weight to the power variable in
explaining why its actions are legitimate. In terms of other bilateral relations, the Chinese
perception is more identity-driven.
This general pattern, however, has an exception, which is in the security dimension. The
Chinese perception of its security policy is largely dictated by the power variable despite how
small the other country is. The East China Sea ADIZ is adjacent to South Korea and Japan. The
South China Sea territorial disputes are with Vietnam, the Philippines, and so on. The road
construction in Donglang is near the border with Bhutan and India. Although one could argue
that the United States is better friends with these countries than with China, these countries are
smaller and less powerful than China. Facing them, China continues to build up its military and
security capabilities and hope to outrun their military capabilities more. This strategy is very
likely to fall into the security dilemma.
Last but not least, according to the Chinese perception of the change of rules or norms
variable, its threat level should not be high as well. In the security arena, its rejection of the
Hague ruling has legal grounds. In multilateral diplomacy and economic development arenas, it
believes that its institutions and initiatives are complementary to the existing global order.
BRICS protects the interests of emerging markets. BRI promotes the interests of a region
neglected by the U.S. and Europe. AIIB provides extra funding that addresses the lack of funding
in the region. Thus, China argues these actions should not be deemed as a subversion to existing
global order.
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II. The Assessment of the American Perception
The American perception of the Chinese foreign policy is shaped by power, identity, the
change of rules or norms, and information variables. The power variable is the most important
variable for the U.S. perception, as it runs through all dimensions. Because China’s power has
increased all-around, the threat perception of the U.S. is high. Regarding its bilateral relations,
the U.S. sees China becoming more and more capable to shape the decision-making of foreign
countries through a combination of coercion and charm offensive. This reflects that the
American perception focuses more on the power asymmetry between China and other nations.
Regarding Chinese foreign policy in security and economic arenas, Washington views that
Beijing’s policies directly challenge the interests of the U.S. and American hegemony in the
region. Under such a zero-sum perspective, any Chinese action, from islands reclamation in the
South China Sea to credit loans to the Philippines, would be deemed challenging to the U.S.
The identity variable has also had a huge impact on the American perception.
Historically, China and the U.S. belong to the communist and capitalist blocs, respectively. As of
today, although the Communist blocs collapsed almost three decades ago and China is not a true
communist regime, there is a strong attitude in the U.S. that the U.S. and China do not share a
single identity, or, that they do not have enough characteristics in common to form a very close
relationship. This is demonstrated by the fact that the general public in the U.S. fears the creation
of a G-2 between the U.S. and China, which is also shared by the scholar field, the White House,
the Capitol, and the Pentagon. Most recently, while China and Russia had a good relationship
and both of them are listed as the largest threat to the U.S., China is increasingly characterized as
the enemy of America instead of by a more neutral term. In addition, China has not fully
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complied with the rules of the WTO, nor has it abided by the Hague ruling under UNCLOS. The
U.S. also believes that two countries are not bounded by the shared interests and identity because
China has not fully accepted the post-World War II global order.
The change of rules or norms variable also explains some of U.S. threat perception of
Chinese foreign policy. Because China has not abided by rules of existing rules of major
traditional multilateral institutions, the U.S. deems the Chinese-led multilateral institutions and
initiatives an institutional challenge to the existing rules or norms. The U.S. perceives that, by
establishing new organizations, China became more provocative to the existing global order
because it has made the transition from implicitly violating existing rules or norms to explicitly
setting up and institutionalizing alternative rules or norms. Such a change stirs up the American
perception of Chinese efforts in multilateral diplomacy and global governance.
The combined effect of the power, identity, and the change of rules or norms variables
makes it more formidable than simply the addition of the influence of all three. Because of low
transparency of the Chinese government, the lack of information even pushes the American
threat perception of China even higher. The U.S. perception, however, could potentially fall into
a few heuristic filters of misperceptions.
Across dimensions, we can see that the American perception is mostly rooted in the
power variable. Overemphasis on the power variable often leads to the danger of the security
dilemma. If Washington only focuses on the rise of Chinese power and the reduction of the
difference between American and Chinese power, that means that the structural threat of
Thucydides’ Trap could be true. As the power variable has an almost disproportionately
important weight in the function of the American threat perception, the threat of Thucydides’
Trap depends not only on the level of China’s power but also on whether the power variable will
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continue to dictate the American perception. To escape from Thucydides’ Trap, on the one hand,
the U.S. should take efforts to look beyond the power variable. The U.S. President and his
cabinet should not be filled only with people who believe that capability shapes intention. China,
on the other hand, should incentivize the U.S. to look at other variables by promoting
opportunities for collaboration.
Additionally, the American perception could potentially face the problem of cognitive
dissonance. China has been historically part of the communist regime and currently in a good
relationship with Russia, cognitive consistency should make the U.S. suspicious to any Chinese
actions. What’s more dangerous, cognitive consistency could carry out to all dimensions. Even
when China has benign intentions, the U.S. may not be able to fully understand its goodwill.

III. Policy Prescriptions by Dimensions
As we have analyzed both the Chinese and American perceptions of the Chinese foreign
policy, I will now provide solutions to major differences of both perceptions and their
misperceptions by bilateral relations, multilateral diplomacy, security and military, and economic
cooperation dimensions. I will give out several measures to lower threat perception of each other
by providing confidence-building measures as well as crisis management mechanisms. Note,
these policy prescriptions are provided as direct responses to my comparison and analysis that
are based on the theoretical framework. None of these policies are easier to be done than said, as
a lot of them face serious practical constraints. Nonetheless, if they could be implemented at
some point, threat perception would be reduced by much. Thus, my focus in this section would
be to inform readers what type of policies would reduce threat perceptions instead of what
policies are most practical and easiest to implement.
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Bilateral Relations
In China’s bilateral relations with foreign countries, the major difference between the
American and Chinese perceptions is that, while China uses the power variable to explain its
bilateral relations with stronger countries and the identity variable to explain its relations with
weaker countries, the U.S. puts its full attention on China’s capacity. Given the difference, there
are several ways to bring the expectation the American and Chinese perceptions together.
1. In terms of U.S.-China relations, both countries should continue to deepen their
commitments of major dialogue and communications mechanisms, including the four
dialogues that President Trump and President Xi agreed on. Given that Sino-U.S.
relations are facing escalated tensions, both the U.S. and China should ensure that timely
communications through both formal and informal channels are always open.
2. In terms of Sino-Russian relations, the U.S. should comprehend the Chinese perspective
that a Sino-Russian alliance is unlikely to happen. Although certain rhetoric is employed
by the U.S. to achieve its strategic ends, the U.S. should understand putting Russia and
China in the same category is inaccurate. During the process of policy-making, U.S.
officials should remind themselves of not treating China and Russia with the same
measures.
3. In terms of China’s relations with its neighbors and other developing countries, China
should understand that the concerns of the United States. China should practice what it
preaches and publicize what it has achieved. China should come up with a clear standard
of its bilateral cooperation with these countries. Such a standard will provide more
information to the rest of the world and score higher transparency.
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Multilateral Diplomacy
In the multilateral diplomacy dimension, the center of bilateral tensions is the change of
rules or norms. The Chinese government believes that the BRICS, BRI, and AIIB are all
additions to the existing global orders. Each of them speaks to a region or a group of countries
whose interests were not properly represented in global institutions before. The BRICS
represents the interests of emerging markets. BRI and AIIB promote economic integration and
development to the Eurasian landmass where, to the west, there is the European Union, and to
the east, there is NAFTA. The United States, however, believes that the China-led initiatives and
institutions lower the standard of traditional multilateral institutions and even endanger core
American interests. Given the problem, several policy recommendations are given below.
1. Since China acknowledges that post-World War II global institutions are still the best
institutions. Both China and the United States should facilitate global governance under
the system of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
so on. Both countries should aim to protect and strengthen the traditional institutions.
These institutions should continue to serve as the authority of international political,
economic and security decision-making.
2. New-coming regional and global institutions should be encouraged by the United States
so long as it put all participants on an equal footing and does not violate core interests of
traditional institutions. The U.S. should not deliberately hinder the efforts of emerging
markets who strive to gain an appropriate representation in global institutions as their
economies grow.
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3. China should provide more opportunities and mechanisms through which the U.S.
government or American organizations could either participate in or gain information
about ongoing activities in China-led initiatives and institutions. China should be
incentivized to provide necessary information in order to cancel out American concerns.
4. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate at combating climate change, containing
piracy activities, protecting environment and biodiversity, conducting humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, and other global governance activities. In these fields, both
countries have shared interests, and both have the responsibility to uphold these
initiatives as the largest and second-largest economies and polities in the world. These
initiatives will help formulate shared identity in global governance and reduce hostility.

Security and Military
Unlike in other dimensions, both the U.S. and China focused a lot on the power and
information variables in the perception framework. The danger of security and status dilemmas is
imminent. To lower the threat perceptions and the risks of military confrontation, several
measures are provided to achieve this end.
1. Both the Chinese and American governments should be aware of the danger of security
and status dilemmas. Two lessons should be drawn from the dilemmas. First, military
leaders should not dictate the policy-making procedure of each government. This is
especially important for the U.S. government as there have been several retired generals
serving in the current administration. Second, both American and Chinese decisionmakers should always remember the shared stakes both countries have in global
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governance and a healthy world economy in addition to the security interests they have.
Focusing excessively on security would result in the danger of security dilemma.
2. Direct Military and security dialogues at between both governments should continue to
open. At the same time, more direct military-to-military hotline at lower level should be
created under the legal permission of both countries.
3. Since both countries agree that future military encounters are more likely to happen on
the sea, both should start to establish a framework that allows future bilateral negotiations
on a bilateral naval code of conduct that provides necessary guidance to future maritime
encounters. Such a code of conduct helps to align the expectations of each other.
4. In the most militarily hotly contested region, including the South China Sea and the
Korean peninsula, both countries should understand the concerns of each other. Although
both countries have vastly different interests, both should be self-restrained and
understand that any defensive actions could be perceived offensively by the other.
5. Both the U.S. and China should cooperate to face non-traditional maritime challenges
such as anti-piracy, environmental degradation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
missions across different oceans. Joint drills should be carried out when permissible.
These activities will help both navies to formulate shared identity in peacekeeping
missions around the world.

Economic Engagement
China believes that it shares the same identity and interests as a supporter of liberal
global economic order. However, the U.S. does not see it the same way as China does.
Apparently, there is a difference between how the U.S. and China think whether they have a
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shared identity institutional-wise. For China, the shared identity means that both the U.S. and
China could be better off by exploiting comparative advantages. Therefore, a win-win situation
should come with economic cooperation. For the U.S., a shared identity as supporters of global
free trade is more pertinent to the institutional arrangement. Especially after President Trump
came into office, the U.S. has become much more dissatisfied with China’s domestic economic
and institutional reform. In January 2018, the U.S. trade representative even vocally stated that
having China joined WTO in 2001 is a mistake.222 In a few months, the U.S. and China have
started a trade war. Such a difference could not be solved in a day. In order to ease tensions and
achieve a win-win situation that is acceptable to both, below are some solutions.
1. In line with President Xi Jinping’s speech at 2018 Bo’ao Asia Forum, China should
continue to liberalize its economy by lower tariffs in accordance with WTO, allowing
foreign capital to enter Chinese markets that do not endanger national security, and
enforcing the protection of property rights.
2. The Trump Administration should restrain itself from developing limited trade conflicts
into an all-out economic war. Such a result may resonate with domestic political
supporters in the short run. Nonetheless, the long run costs are not bearable for either the
United States or China.
3. Both countries should continue to use official dialogues developed during the Xi-Trump
meeting at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. The comprehensive economic dialogue should
serve a more important role than what it is. Both countries should continue to send
delegates to each other’s in order to achieve timely communications.
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4. Both countries should seek economic cooperation outside China and the United States.
Economic cooperation at the international level could certainly help lower bilateral
economic tensions. Diplomatically, China should continue to invite the United States to
join AIIB. Practically, China should try to invite some major American firms to
participate and bid in some BRI projects. Both will help to show an open attitude of
China to the United States.

To reiterate, all these policy suggestions above are simplistic compared to real situations.
However, they serve as examples of what types of policies are able to lower threat perception
and understand the perspective of each other better for both the United States and China.
Admittedly, the gap between the American and Chinese perceptions is large, and U.S.-China
relations is currently on a trajectory that is likely to worsen in the imminent future. Nonetheless,
the policymakers in both countries should strive to create necessary conditions to implement
appropriate policies to bring in the gap and form better U.S.-China relations. Only in doing so, a
more harmonious global society would ever be possible to come into realization.
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